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Summary 
The purpose of this policy paper is to analyse and propose ideas about how the European Union could have 
a greater impact on reducing poverty in Latin America through its trade policy, in conjunction with other 
policy instruments. To do this, the authors analyze the experience of the EU’s Generalized System of 
Preference (GSP), a scheme aimed to help poor countries adapt to the international trading system. Overall, 
this regime has not proven effective for this purpose nor is there any evidence that it has had a significantly 
positive impact on reducing poverty in developing countries in general or in Latin America. This paper starts 
with an overview of the context affecting this issue, including a review of the literature on the link between 
trade and poverty, an analysis of the contemporary situation in Latin America, focusing on poverty and 
inequality, reasons why it is important to look at the GSP presently, this region’s trade and development 
experience and overall ties between the EU and Latin America. The second section of the paper begins with a 
review of EU trade policy towards developing countries, stressing the GSP. Following that, it analyzes how 
the Latin American countries have used the GSP, with what results and what obstacles. This general 
treatment is complemented by two case studies, Bolivia and Costa Rica, which illustrate the problems more 
specifically. The final chapter provides conclusions and policy recommendations that should be taken into 
consideration in the current process of reform of the GSP. 
 
Resumen 
El objetivo de este documento de trabajo es analizar y proponer ideas sobre cómo la Unión Europea podría 
tener un mayor impacto sobre la reducción de la pobreza en América Latina a través de su política comercial, 
junto con otros instrumentos de política. Para hacer esto, los autores analizan la experiencia del Sistema 
Generalizado de Preferencias (SGP) de la UE, un esquema que tiene la intención de ayudar a los países 
pobres a adaptarse al sistema internacional de comercio. En general, este régimen no ha sido eficaz para este 
fin ni existe evidencia de que haya tenido un impacto significativo y positivo en la reducción de la pobreza ni 
en todos los países en desarrollo ni en América Latina en particular. Este estudio empieza con una visión 
general del contexto alrededor del tema, incluyendo una revisión de la literatura sobre el vínculo entre el 
comercio y la pobreza, un análisis de la situación actual en América Latina orientado hacia la pobreza y la 
desigualdad, las razones por las cuales es importante estudiar al SGP actualmente, la experiencia comercial y 
de desarrollo de esta región, y los lazos generales entre la UE y América Latina. La segunda sección del texto 
comienza con un repaso de la política comercial de la UE hacia los países en desarrollo, enfocado en el SGP. 
A continuación se analiza como los países latinoamericanos han utilizado el SGP, con qué resultados y 
obstáculos. Se complementa este tratamiento general con dos estudios de caso, Bolivia y Costa Rica, que 
ilustran los problemas con mayor detalle. El capítulo final incluye conclusiones y recomendaciones de 
política que deben tomarse en cuenta en el actual proceso de reforma del SGP. 
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Introduction 
 
The international trading system is currently 
in a state of flux, being a cause of concern 
for many countries, especially for those in 
developing regions. Multilateral negotiations 
in the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
have not advanced as rapidly as hoped, and 
a number of bilateral and regional trade 
liberalization deals –i.e., the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA) and the European 
Union (EU)-Southern Common Market 
(Mercosur) Association Agreement— are 
also in difficulties. This situation seems to 
reflect several conflicts at present. The main 
difficulty has to do with how to liberalize 
commerce, not so much as whether this 
should be done. For some, trade should be 
as free as possible, while others argue that 
many countries and particularly poor groups 
in those nations are not prepared for such 
liberalization and that there ought to be 
ways to take into account their special 
conditions. In other words, trade rules 
should take more account of different 
development levels and needs. 
 
That was, indeed, the main reason why the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 
was created over 30 years ago. As such, the 
GSP is probably one of the longest lasting 
tools for development policy that the 
European Union (and other Quad members) 
has at its disposal, and there are no serious 
plans to eliminate it in the near future.  In 
fact, the current regulation was extended 
one more year and the European Com-
mission launched a policy reflection process 
with a Communication (EC, 2004e) in July 
2004 aimed at approving a new 10-year 
regulation by mid 2005. Despite this, it is a 
trade policy instrument that is considered by 
many to be “a ‘second-best’ arrangement that 
may also divide developing countries” 
(UNCTAD, 2003: ix). This state of opinion 
has a lot to do with the general lack of 
information about how it functions, and 
what has been its development impact1. As a 
result, as one author noted, "the value of 
trade preferences as a tool of development is 
uncertain" (Lister, 1997: 122). Another 
recent evaluation by trade economist 
William Cline (2003: 68) is even more 
                                                          
1 The European Commission itself admits there are 
“difficulties for a quantitative assessment of the system” (EC, 
2004e: 4).  
 
damning: “few would disagree that the GSP 
has fallen far short of the original hope that 
it would be a major vehicle for deve-
lopment… its benefits have been meagre.” 
 
Equally controversial has been the long-
running and largely rhetorical debate over 
whether trade is more important than aid in 
international efforts to promote develop-
ment. Within this context, preferential sche-
mes are often, mistakenly, considered by 
pro-trade advocates to be a quasi-aid instru-
ment (because they are non-reciprocal and 
preferential), while aid supporters see them 
as little more than a marginally positive 
trade policy tool. The problem with the first 
opinion is that it ignores the difficulties poor 
countries face in taking advantage of the 
global trading system. As a recent UNCTAD 
(2003: ix) report on preferences notes, “the-
re remain substantial MFN tariffs on many 
developing country exports, and preferences 
continue to have value in increasing export 
opportunities”. Another way of looking at 
this is that “the existence of a preference is 
better for its beneficiaries, ceteris paribus, 
than its non-existence” (Stevens and Ken-
nan, 2004a: 1). 
 
The second view is also arguably short-
sighted since there is limited evidence that 
preferences have had a significant effect on 
development in most countries in the 
South2. The indicator most commonly used 
to measure the performance of the GSP, the 
rate of utilisation (GSP imports/GSP-eligible 
imports), does not provide sufficient infor-
mation to determine its overall impact, let 
alone how it affects poverty, the ultimate 
goal of all EU development policy instru-
ments, including trade policy (see CEC 2000 
and 2002). 
 
Could it be, then, that the Generalised Sys-
tem of Preferences is more of a “symbolic 
policy” designed to placate those com-
plaining about lack of access to rich country 
markets without making too many sacrifices 
on key interests in the EU (i.e. protecting 
certain sectors)? After all, the GSP was 
created for political and developmental 
motives, yet it often seems the first predo-
                                                          
2 As noted in this project’s background paper prepared by 
Andrew Mold (2003), an exception to this is South Korea 
which was able to use trade preferences very effectively, but 
this was during a completely different global context. Today, 
the conditions are less favourable.  
 
   
minate. This was evident in the "reform" of 
the preferences in the 1990s when a special 
scheme was created for Andean countries 
affected by the problems of illegal narcotics 
trafficking3. The political nature of this tool 
was again seen when Pakistan was added to 
the list of beneficiaries of this "Super GSP" 
(or “GSP drugs”) scheme, largely as a result 
of pressures from the United States in the 
aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks4. To a certain extent, the Commis-
sion’s latest communications on this scheme 
(EC, 2004e; 2004f) attempt to tackle this 
deficit by increasing the objectivity of 
criteria, making it more transparent and 
focusing the new scheme on “sustainable de-
velopment”. 
 
These considerations are part of the broader 
context for this policy paper which deals 
with the impact of the EU GSP regime on 
poverty in Latin America. More specifically, 
the objective of this document is to contri-
bute to the policy debate regarding how EU 
development policy towards the region, and 
in particular, the GSP regime, can be impro-
ved so as to enhance the overall impact on 
poverty reduction.   
 
Over the past decade, the European Union 
has increasingly addressed the link between 
trade policy and development on a general 
level, but the GSP does not seem to be a 
significant element in its policy debates5. 
The focus of this paper is on the relatively 
poorer and smaller countries in the Andes 
and Central America which are less inte-
grated into the international economy, re-
                                                          
3 This is officially called the “Special arrangements to combat 
drug production and trafficking”. The “GSP Drugs” arran-
gements provide duty-free access for all industrial products 
included in the general arrangements and some agricultural 
products included in those arrangements as well as some 
others not included. It covers approximately 90% of imports 
from the Andean countries. For some products the margin of 
preference is significant, making it worthwhile to apply these 
arrangements, providing other criteria (i.e., rules of origin) 
are met. 
 
4 Not surprisingly, with regard to the application of the GSP 
“graduation clause”, Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy 
(2003) denies political determinants in a note of December 
15, 2003, saying “this decision taken is not of a political 
nature”. The argument used is that only economic criteria 
were used to graduate “sector V” in Colombia’s exports to the 
EU. 
 
5 In fact, in a presentation of an earlier version of this report 
at the Commission in early 2004, one functionary asked the 
project director whether he was asking too much from the 
GSP in considering its poverty relevance. Furthermore, the 
Communication mentioned earlier (EC, 2004e) does not 
even make an effort to make an explicit link between the GSP 
and the fight against poverty. 
ceive limited foreign investments and are 
more dependent on aid than their neigh-
bours (although Paraguay, a Mercosur mem-
ber state, is also considered as its economic 
conditions are similar and its land-locked 
situation make it especially vulnerable). 
They are also beneficiaries of the “GSP 
Drugs” arrangements, which should be 
particularly useful for promoting exports to 
the EU. In addition, for this group of Latin 
American states, in the short to medium 
term the GSP is the only special trade 
instrument offered by the EU; free trade 
agreements are not a clear option for some 
years to come, as was confirmed at the EU-
Latin American and Caribbean Summit in 
Guadalajara, Mexico in late May, 2004. 
Since these countries are the most vulne-
rable in the region, they should at least be-
nefit more clearly from trade preferences, if 
they are to advance in the struggle against 
poverty. However, the available evidence 
suggests the GSP has not been very useful 
for them. 
 
This policy paper was prepared by the 
Asociación de Investigación y Especializa-
ción sobre Temas Iberoamericanos (AIETI) 
with the support of the European Com-
munity Poverty Reduction Effectiveness Pro-
gramme (EC-PREP)6. It is a result of over 
eight months work by the project team7, 
involving a thorough review of the litera-
ture, policy documents and available statis-
tics, a study visit to EU institutions and La-
tin American diplomatic representations in 
Brussels8, the preparation of a background 
paper (Mold, 2003) as well as policy briefs in 
three Latin American countries by local 
                                                          
 
6 AIETI is a non-profit research centre based in Madrid, Spain 
whose work is oriented towards promoting European Union 
co-operation for Latin American development. EC-PREP 
Project EP/R03/07 was approved in June 2003. EC-PREP is 
financed by the Department for International Development 
(DFID) of the Government of the United Kingdom and is 
managed in collaboration with the European Commission. 
For more information, see: www.ec-prep.org. 
 
7 In addition to the Project Director, Christian Freres, and the 
Principle Researcher, Andrew Mold, two others provided 
research support for this activity: Karina Pacheco (former 
researcher at AIETI and currently professor at the University 
of Cuzco, Peru) and Knud O.v.d. gentschen Felde (former 
research intern at AIETI and presently a graduate student at 
the London School of Economics). 
 
8 The authors thank staff members from the Commission, 
from the European Parliament and from several Latin 
American embassies for their time and consideration in out 
research trip in October 2003: for reasons of confidentiality, 
their names and posts are not included. 
   
specialists9, a research workshop including 
several external experts10, and feedback from 
European Commission staff at a briefing in 
February, 200411. 
 
The paper is organised in two parts, inclu-
ding six chapters, in addition to this intro-
duction and a chapter with conclusions and 
policy recommendations. The first part, con-
sisting of chapters 1-5, establishes the ove-
rall context, both in terms of concepts and 
the basic situation of the preferential regime, 
EU- Latin American economic ties and the 
trade-poverty nexus. 
 
Chapter 1 synthesizes some key findings 
from the literature and empirical studies on 
the link between trade and poverty. The 
second chapter provides an overview of 
Latin America’s current situation, providing 
some arguments for why the EU ought to 
focus more on this region. In Chapter three 
an in-depth explanation is given for why it is 
a good moment to analyse the GSP in gene-
ral and specifically with regards to Latin 
America and how it impacts on poverty in 
this region.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 In that regard, we would like to acknowledge the work of 
Napolean Pacheco, Director of the Fundación Milenio (La 
Paz, Bolivia); Alcides Hernández, Professor at the Univer-
sidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras (Tegucigalpa, 
Honduras); and Ramiro Rodríguez, Associate Researcher, 
Centro de Análisis y Difusión de la Economía Paraguaya 
(Asunción, Paraguay). 
 
10 Special thanks are due to the following people who 
generously contributed their time to this project: Stephen 
Szepesi, researcher at the European Centre for Development 
Policy Management (Maastricht, Netherlands); Ricardo 
Lagos, European representative for the Central American 
Economic Integration Bank/BCIE (Brussels, Belgium); José 
Antonio Sanahuja, Professor at the Universidad Complutense 
de Madrid and Coordinator of the Development and Coope-
ration Department at ICEI (Madrid); and Camilo Tovar, 
researcher, European External Policy Advisors (Brussels, 
Belgium). 
 
11 The authors of this study are grateful to Commission staff 
for participating in this meeting and providing useful 
feedback and critical suggestions which were incorporated 
into later drafts. 
Following that, the fourth chapter reviews 
this region’s development and trade challen-
ges. The fifth chapter, last in the first part of 
the paper, surveys the Community’s ties 
with Latin America, in particular in the eco-
nomic sphere.  
 
The second part of this policy paper inclu-
des its main contributions in terms of re-
search and analysis on the effects of the GSP 
in Latin America. It begins (Chapter 6) with 
a summary of EU trade policy towards deve-
loping countries. The main chapter of this 
section and the paper as a whole (Chapter 7) 
analyses in some depth Latin America’s 
experience with the GSP. It includes two 
case studies (Bolivia and Costa Rica), with 
broader lessons for this preferential regime.  
 
Finally, the project’s main findings are 
summarised in the conclusions, which also 
develops a series of general and specific po-
licy recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
1. The context 
 
1.1. TRADE AND POVERTY: A SET OF 
COMPLEX LINKAGES 
 
In a period when budgetary restrictions have 
become tighter, and the amount of foreign 
aid to developing countries has been stag-
nant or declining, preferential market access 
agreements have become increasingly popu-
lar among the Quad countries (Canada, the 
European Union, Japan and the United Sta-
tes) as a tool for helping the poorest deve-
lopping countries. Their popularity stems 
from two basic characteristics of market a-
ccess agreements. The first is that, in bud-
getary terms, no explicit item has to be in-
cluded ex-ante. Rather, the cost is assumed 
ex–post, in terms of the loss of tariff income 
on imports. In a period of budgetary res-
traint, this advantage is an important one. 
Secondly, against a backdrop of “aid fati-
gue”, it is now widely believed that develop-
ping countries can benefit more from oppor-
tunities to increase their exports than aid 
“hand-outs.” It is commonly implied that 
market access agreements like the European 
Union’s “Everything But Arms” initiative 
which provides free market access to the Eu-
ropean market for the 49 least developed 
countries, have a potentially greater on po-
verty reduction than traditional aid pro-
grammes.    
 
Unfortunately, there is little systematic 
empirical evidence to support this conten-
tion. Trade preferences and poverty reduc-
tion is one of those difficult interface issues 
where there is a notable lack of empirical 
studies. Most existing research into the links 
between trade regimes and poverty has 
focused on the relationships between trade 
liberalisation and poverty12. Neoclassical 
models based on the Stolpher-Samuelson 
theorem assume that increased exports 
promote poverty reduction and diminish 
income inequalities. According to this view, 
an expansion of labour-intensive exports in 
poor countries raises the demand for 
unskilled labour and thus reduces the wage 
differentials between skilled and unskilled 
labour. Nonetheless, this is an incorrect ge-
                                                          
12 The European Commission (CEC, 2004), in a brochure on 
the Doha Development Round, admits that “it would be false 
to say that trade automatically leads to development, or even 
that trade automatically leads to growth. The process is too 
complex, too multi-faceted, for that”. 
 
neralization for most Latin American coun-
tries, where the abundant factor in most 
countries of the region is not unskilled 
labour but rather some natural resource, and 
labour skills in the region rank at an inter-
mediate level on a world scale. More poin-
tedly, endemic inequality in Latin America 
has meant that trade liberalisation has had 
little impact on the poor. Indeed, as Cornia 
and Court (2003: 18) observe, "contrary to 
the experience of East Asia, recent trade li-
beralisation in Latin America has been asso-
ciated with increased wage inequality". 
 
Exhaustive reviews of the literature tend to 
dwell on how the influx of imports changes 
relative prices, and how the poor adjust to 
the subsequent macroeconomic and sectoral 
shocks13. The implication is that poverty 
levels are conditioned principally by the pa-
ssive response of the poor to trade libera-
lisation. Relatively little attention is paid to 
how the poor actively take up the greater 
opportunities to export. Moreover, there has 
been a tendency to treat trade as a homo-
genous variable, when in practice it is far 
from that. There are qualitative differences 
between different kinds of trade which have 
enormous implications for its poverty-reduc-
tion potential. For instance, commodity-
chain analysis of African horticultural ex-
ports have revealed that only a very small 
percentage of the rents generated by the 
export industry are actually received by 
nationals, most of the profits being captured 
by the multinationals (Dolan and Hum-
prheys, 1999). Similarly, in the case of Cen-
tral American maquila, the amount of local 
value-added is extraordinarily low, reaching 
barely 2 percent (Buitelaar and Perez, 2000). 
Evidently, when linkages with the local 
economy are low or negligible, the poverty 
reduction implications are very different 
from when the export industry in question is 
deeply embedded in the local economy.    
 
Poverty is not easily defined or described – it 
has many characteristics, and many causes. 
This is especially true in the turbulent si-
tuation in Latin America, where the incon-
gruities and contradictions in economic and 
social policy over the last two decades are 
                                                          
13 See, for instance, Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2004), 
Bannister and Thugge (2001), or McKay, Winters and Kedir 
(2000).  
 
   
readily apparent. The search for a single po-
licy instrument or paradigm in such a con-
text is like searching for the “holy grail”: no 
evidence of its existence has been found. A 
plethora of policy instruments have been 
identified in the past (e.g. micro-credits) and 
applied in Latin America, but invariably the 
results have been disappointing. An explicit 
recognition of this is essential if the policy 
debate is to move forward. There is certainly 
a need for a class-stratified, differential a-
pproach to the analysis of trade growth and 
poverty reduction. 
 
Certainly, the empirical facts suggest that 
simplistic relationships can be discounted. 
For instance, much literature has been pro-
duced in recent years on the damaging 
impact of agricultural subsidies in the indus-
trialised countries on developing country 
agricultural markets, both because of the 
loss of export markets and because of the 
negative impact of inflows of subsidised 
agricultural products. But it is unclear whe-
ther cheap subsidised imports are always 
prejudicial to the poor For the majority of 
poor in heavily urbanised Latin America, a 
first impact of cheap subsidised imports 
from the North may be to reduce food 
expenditure and increase consumer welfare 
(at the expense of tax-payers in the North). 
 
By drawing on a wide range of recent 
literature, UNCTAD (2004d) provide a more 
complete vision as to how the poverty-
reducing potential of trade can be reduced. 
The authors stress that too much literature 
on the interface between trade and poverty 
reduction has adopted an excessively narrow 
focus. The analysis of trade and poverty 
reduction needs to go beyond the issue of 
trade liberalisation and take into account the 
following: 
 
• the effects of primary commodity 
dependence; 
• the balance of payments constraint on 
poverty reduction; 
• the relationship between export and 
import instability and vulnerability 
• the relationship between upgrading 
the composition of exports towards 
higher-quality and higher-skill products 
and the social exclusion of poorer pro-
ducers from livelihoods 
• bargaining power in global production 
chains and the distribution of gains from 
trade, 
• how the development of non-
traditional exports affects gender 
relations; 
• the effects of trends in, and variability 
of, the terms of trade on poverty; 
• the relationships between trade and 
employment; and 
• the relationships between trade and 
inequality 
 
The list is clearly a long one, and the im-
plications of such a number of complex in-
terrelated issues means that simple a priori 
conclusions are not possible.   
 
In this context, the insights of Carter and 
Barham (1996) are highly relevant. Basing 
their analysis on three case studies (Chilean 
fruit, Guatemalan vegetable, and Paraguayan 
soybean and wheat exports), these authors 
observe that there has been considerable 
heterogeneity in the impacts of agro-exports 
on growth and equity in Latin America, and 
small farmers have often been excluded from 
the benefits of agro-export booms. Whereas 
they describe the Paraguayan experience as 
highly exclusionary (with diminished pea-
sant land access and falling sector em-
ployment), the situation in Guatemala has 
been very broadly based (with increases in 
both sector employment and small-farm 
land access), and the Chilean boom is classi-
fied as ambiguous (with diminished small-
farm land access, but probably increased 
employment in this sector). One conclusion 
from this is that basic social and economic 
inequalities have marginalised the bulk of 
the rural poor from being able to take 
advantage from the benefits of market access 
agreements.  
 
Clearly, therefore, policy instruments of pro-
moting trade have not been finely-tuned to 
the needs of the poor. In part, at least, exces-
sively simple characterisations of poverty are 
to blame for this situation. Sender (2003) 
makes some very pertinent observations on 
this point. There is a fallacy, for instance, 
that the majority of the rural poor in 
developing countries are farmers and self-
employed. The lack of capacity of these 
groups to take advantage of preferences like 
the GSP+ is thus often seen in terms of their 
reduced access to inputs (seeds, planting 
material, fertilizers and agro-chemicals, as 
well as credit), and a simple failure to be 
aware of the market access opportunities 
that exist. The corresponding policy advice, 
   
pace Carter and Barhnam (1996), is to 
facilitate access to inputs, credit and infor-
mation. Yet the record of such schemes in 
the past has been strikingly poor. Sender 
suggests that failures like these are due to an 
unrealistic characterisation of the rural poor, 
ignoring important stylistic facts such as a 
majority of the rural poor tend to be poor 
women without education and without 
stable employment. Coherent with this idea, 
Deere and Leon (2003) stress very clearly 
the unequal distribution of land assets in 
Latin America, where in countries like 
Guatemala and Paraguay less than 10 
percent of rural landholders are women. In 
such circumstances, does it make much 
sense to design policies which purportedly 
enable the poor to take advantage of market 
access opportunities, when the relevant and 
most needy populations may not be in a 
position to take advantage of such 
opportunities? 
 
 
Table 1 
Relative Growth Performance between Regions (GDP per capita, 1961-2002) 
 
 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2
East Asia & Pacific 2.6 4.6 5.6 8.3 4.5 5.2
High income: OECD 4.4 2.6 2.5 1.2 2.3 0.4
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
2.5 3.5 -0.8 2.9 1.2 -1.3
Middle East & North Africa - 1.5 -0.8 0.9 1.4 0.6
South Asia 1.9 0.7 3.3 3.1 3.5 2.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.6 0.8 -1.1 -1.4 0.6 0.9
World 3.5 1.9 1.4 0.7 1.7 0.2
SOURCE: Calculations from World Bank Indicators Online data.  
Simple arithmetic averages of growth rates (i.e. not weighted). 
 
 
 
 
1.2. THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION IN 
LATIN AMERICA. WHY THE CONTINENT 
DESERVES MORE ATTENTION ON THE 
PART OF THE EU 
 
The remit for this project is all the more urgent 
bearing in mind the contemporary situation of 
the region. Despite (or, as some critics would 
have it, because of) adopting “Washington 
Consensus”-type policies of market 
liberalisation and free trade since the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the results for most 
Latin American countries have been 
enormously disappointing. To a large extent, 
the region has not even initiated a recovery 
from the disastrous situation after the onset 
of the debt crisis14.  
                                                          
14 The debt crisis in particular had a profound and deeply 
damaging impact on the long-term prospects for poverty 
reduction in the region, a crisis from which most countries 
have yet to recover. In the aftermath of the First World War, 
John Maynard Keynes made an eloquent declaration 
concerning how it would be a dangerous folly to impose 
punitive reparations on Germany (“The Economic Conse-
quences of Peace”). Yet it is a little recognised fact that, as a 
 
 
Relative growth performance over the last 
two decades has been poor, and no evidence 
is emerging of a recovery (Table 1). 
 
 
Indeed, over the last three years Argentina 
has probably already beaten Russia to the 
record for the highest income-per-capita drop 
in peacetime living memory, although this 
record may be short-lived ---Venezuela 
plunged towards an income per capita drop 
in 2003 which was even higher than those of 
Russia and Argentina (Palma, 2003: 147). 
 
 
The crisis is not confined to the economic 
sphere. After the “vuelta de los barracones” 
in the 1980s and a rapid disappearance of the 
remaining dictatorial regimes in the conti-
nent, confidence in democratic solutions to 
social and economic problems is at dange-
rously low ebb. A recent survey of the Lati-
                                                                                    
share of GDP, the negative net transfer of financial resources 
from Latin America was even larger than that of Germany after 
World War I (Palma, 2003). In this context, the subsequent 
failure to recover from the debt crisis is less surprising.  
   
noBarómetro, a poll covering 17 countries in 
Central and South America, reveals that 52% 
of the Latin American’s surveyed agreed with 
the statement “I wouldn’t mind if a non-
democratic government came to power if it 
could solve economic problems”.15 In coun-
tries like Paraguay and Peru, close to 90 
percent of the population professed that they 
were not satisfied with the way democracy 
was working in their countries. Indeed, jud-
ging by the current social and political 
tensions, in a number of countries in the re-
gion the situation may be reaching breaking 
point (e.g. Bolivia or Ecuador). The stoic 
capacity of Latin Americans to withstand 
economic hardships, insecurity and insta-
bility may be reaching its limits. 
 
 
One of the greatest frustrations in this 
resource-rich region has been its inability to 
reduce poverty levels over time. According to 
the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 227 million 
Latin Americans lived in poverty in 2003. 
This represents some 44% of the population. 
Some 60 million get by on less than one 
dollar a day, the international standard for 
extreme poverty. 
 
 
As Table 2A shows, despite small improve-
ments in the 1990s, the percentage of Latin 
Americans living in poverty today is larger 
than 25 years ago. In absolute terms (see 
Table 2B) in 2002 there were 85 million 
more poor people in the region than in 1980. 
The share of the region’s population who are 
considered to be the extreme poor (defined 
differently in each country), has remained at 
about the same level over the past two 
decades. However, in absolute terms there 
has been an increase of more than 30 million 
suffering this fate, a 50% jump between 1980 
and 2002. Rural poverty has proven to be 
particularly immune to efforts to attack this 
problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Cited in “The Economist”, 1/11/2003, “The Stubborn 
Survival of Frustrated Democrats”, page 53.  
The region is also the world champion in 
income inequality16, with a GINI coefficient 
of 0.51 (compared with 0.37 in South East 
Asia and 0.29 in Eastern Europe)17. At the 
end of the 1990s, one fifth of the richest 
people in Latin America received three fifths 
of its income, while the poorest fifth had to 
make do with only 3% of regional income. 
This inequality is aggravated by other forms 
of social exclusion based on gender, race, 
age, ethnicity, etc.18 
 
 
Poverty is not easily defined or described – it 
has many characteristics, and many causes. 
This is especially true in the turbulent 
situation in Latin America, where the 
incongruities and contradictions in economic 
and social policy over the last two decades 
are readily apparent. The search for a single 
policy instrument or paradigm in such a 
context is like searching for the “holy grail”: 
no evidence of its existence has been found. 
A plethora of policy instruments have been 
identified in the past (e.g. micro-credits) and 
applied in Latin America, but invariably the 
results have been disappointing. An explicit 
recognition of this is essential if the policy 
debate is to move forward. 
 
 
Confronted by such a situation, one position 
of the European Union could be that the 
contemporary predicament of Latin America 
and the plight of its poor is not particularly 
of its concern: trading and economic links 
with the region are generally low and, 
although migratory movements towards the 
EU are increasing, they are still completely 
overshadowed by sub-Saharan and North 
African immigration. Why, then, the concern 
for Latin America? 
 
                                                          
16 Two excellent sources on this subject are the study by Albert 
Berry (1997) and a recent World Bank report (de Ferrant, et 
al, 2003). Another recent investigation (Ganuza, et al, 2004) 
reviews the impact of economic liberalization in the last two 
decades on poverty and inequality. 
 
17 This figure is a regional, non-weighted average of inequality 
within countries. 
 
18 Data from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
document, “Inequality, exclusion and poverty in Latin Ame-
rica and the Caribbean” prepared for European Commis-
sion/IADB Seminar on Social Cohesion in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, June 2003  
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/la/sc/idb.pdf). 
 
  
Table 2 
 Poverty in Latin America 
 
Table 2A 
 Percentage share of population living in Poverty, 1980-2002 a 
 
 Poorb Extreme poor c 
 Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
1980 40.5 29.8 59.9 18.6 10.6 32.7 
1990 48.3 41.4 65.4 22.5 15.3 40.4 
1997 43.5 36.5 63.0 19.0 12.3 37.6 
1999 43.8 37.1 63.7 18.5 11.9 38.3 
2000 432.5 35.9 62.5 18.1 11.7 37.8 
2001 43.2 37.0 62.3 18.5 12.2 38.0 
2002 44.0 38.4 61.8 19.4 13.5 37.9 
 
Table 2B 
Absolute numbers of people living in poverty, 1980-2002 (millions)a 
 
 Poorb Extremely poorc 
 Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
1980 135.9 62.9 73.0 62.4 22.5 39.9 
1990 200.2 121.7 78.5 93.4 45.0 48.4 
1997 203.8 125.7 78.2 88.8 42.2 46.6 
1999 211.4 134.2 77.2 89.4 43.0 46.4 
2000 207.1 131.8 75.3 88.4 42.8 45.6 
2001 213.9 138.7 75.2 91.7 45.8 45.9 
2002 221.4 146.7 74.8 97.4 51.6 45.8 
 
SOURCES: ECLAC, 2003: Panorama Social de América Latina 2002-3 (page 50), based on household surveys 
of the respective countries 
Notes: 
a) Estimations corresponding to 18 countries in the region, plus Haiti 
b) People with income below the poverty line, including those in extreme poverty 
c) People with income below the extreme poverty line 
 
 
If, as looks increasingly likely, the region 
slips into further economic, social and 
political crisis, as the regional hegemon, is it 
not essentially a problem for United States to 
deal with? Although the historical colonial 
links between Europe and Latin America run 
deep, since the 19th Century and the decal-
ration of the Monroe Doctrine, the region 
has been firmly within the sphere of influen-
ce of the United States. The fates of the Uni-
ted States and Mexico are already deeply 
entwined, and economic and migratory links 
between the US and the rest of the region 
are intensifying. Seen from this stance, Eu-
rope has its own concerns, such as the Eas-
tern European Enlargement or the Middle 
East and North Africa.   
 
 
 
In this paper, we argue that this would be a 
fundamentally wrong and short-sighted 
position to take. In terms of contemporary 
priorities (and despite declarations to the 
contrary by the Bush administration at the 
beginning of its term in office), subsequent 
events on the international scene (parti-
cularly “9/11”) have meant that Latin Ame-
rica has received a very low priority even 
from the United States. Given the apparent 
disinterest of US, there is a window of op-
portunity for the EU to make an effective 
and more pro-active contribution to helping 
resolve the problems of region. Distrustful of 
the overbearing influence of the United Sta-
tes on the region, it is moreover a contri-
bution which would probably be welcomed 
by many Latin American countries them-
selves. Nonetheless, experience shows that 
   
policy built on the back of simple altruism 
does not tend to endure: identifying mutual 
interests is a surer way of guaranteeing the 
permanence of any policy solutions. There 
are many reasons for the EU to be concerned 
for the current state of crisis in which the 
region is immersed. Latin America should be 
important to the EU for both altruistic mo-
tives (the concern to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals/MDGs) and self-interest 
(Latin America has a considerable amount of 
extra-EU stock of foreign direct investment 
(FDI), for instance). 
 
 
 
1.3. WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO LOOK AT 
THE GSP IN LATIN AMERICA NOW  
 
Against this backdrop, there are several 
reasons why it is important to analyse the 
GSP at present. The first reason has to do 
with the current state of play in global trade 
politics. A major part of this is the crisis of 
WTO Doha “Development” Round, due to, 
inter alia, serious differences between rich 
and poor countries about what to include in 
(or keep out of) the agenda and what should 
be the pace of liberalization. Even before 
this current problem –which the July 2004 
agreement may or may not resolve—, as a 
result of growing preoccupation with the 
plight of the least developed countries, there 
has been a certain resurgence of interest in 
preferences.19 This has been translated into 
new policy initiatives, including the United 
States Africa Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA) and the EU Everything But Arms 
(EBA) initiative, created in 2000 and 2001, 
respectively. Even poor nations are consi-
dering strengthening the Global System of 
Trade Preferences among Developing Coun-
tries (GSTP), a scheme established in 1989 
(UNCTAD, 2004b).  
 
This trend has gone against the fairly 
common view that free trade agreements 
(FTAs) are inherently more relevant than 
unilateral preferences and should therefore 
be the end goal for developing countries in 
their relations with the European Union. Of 
course, this vision ignored the fact that 
                                                          
19 For instance, in March 2004 the World Bank and the WTO 
organized a workshop on the GSP in Geneva. UNCTAD 
(2003) recently published a major study on trade preferences 
for the least developed countries. A number of academic 
studies dealing with preferences have come out (Stevens and 
Kennan, 2004a; ODI 2004) in the past year or so. 
 
many of these countries were not even 
offered the possibility to negotiate an FTA 
with the EU, so for them, preferences are the 
only option available. In sum, given slow 
movement on multilateral liberalization and 
delays on bilateral agreements, should the 
EU work to improve the preferential regime 
for all developing countries? This seems to 
be one of the rationales for the recent Com-
mission policy proposal (EC, 2004e). 
 
A second reason is that in the past the GSP 
was renewed and “reformed” with little de-
bate outside (and even inside) EU insti-
tutions. This is because it is seen, on the one 
hand, as a highly technical matter, and, on 
the other, as not very relevant when com-
pared with the development impact of other 
policies; therefore, most are happy to leave it 
to the bureaucrats and technicians. Would it 
be useful to broaden the public discussion 
on preferences in order to strengthen their 
legitimacy? 
 
The third reason is that the GSP does –or at 
least, it could—matter. In the period 1997-
2002 about 20% of Latin American exports 
were able to enter the EU under this scheme; 
that represents close to 47 billion euros in 
goods. As we shall see in the case studies, 
the GSP has helped a number of countries to 
diversify their export offer (see Gonzalez, 
2003). According to the Costa Rican go-
vernment (one of the few to analyse the 
socioeconomic impact of these preferences), 
80% of the companies in one of the most 
important export sectors –plants and flo-
wers— are small and medium enterprises; 
that sector is closely linked with the fight 
against poverty and exclusion since it 
employs many women and immigrants. The 
Colombian cut flower industry is another 
example of a sector which expanded thanks 
to these preferences. Unfortunately, infor-
mation on a broader variety of sectors and 
specific products in the whole region is not 
available, so it is difficult to come up with 
definitive conclusions on the poverty impact 
of the GSP. 
 
However, we do know that, despite impro-
vements in the conditions introduced in this 
scheme over this period (through the De-
cember 2001 Regulation), for the Latin 
American countries the value of GSP im-
ports declined almost thirty per cent in 
absolute terms. The utilisation rate (prefe-
rential imports divided by eligible imports) 
   
fell only slightly, but what is particularly 
worrisome is that the utility rate (prefe-
rential imports divided by total imports) fell 
by half. Indeed, between 1997 and 2002 
only in one country did this scheme present 
a greater level of effectiveness (Argentina), 
in four countries the levels remained more 
or less the same (Cuba, Panama, Uruguay 
and Venezuela), and in the majority of coun-
tries the effective usefulness of the GSP fell 
considerably. Overall, Latin American coun-
tries utility rate was 15% in 2002, less than 
one half of the total for all developing 
countries (33%).  
 
Whether one argues that this problem of 
preference erosion is a result of Latin Ame-
rican incapacity to export, deficiencies in the 
GSP itself or increased EU barriers to access 
(all of which are legitimate factors), the 
result is the same: these economies are not 
reaping the potential benefits of this pre-
ferential scheme, which in turn means the 
poverty-reduction possibilities of this ins-
trument are not fully realised.  So, even if a 
significant part of the solution lies in better 
conditions and policies in the region, clearly 
another part should be dealt with through 
improvements in the GSP (together with 
other complementary policies). What sort of 
changes could be instituted to increase 
access without making the regulation more 
complicated and difficult to manage? 
 
A fourth motive for reviewing the GSP at 
this time is that a number of problems have 
arisen in its application. Specifically, we 
refer to the “graduation clause” introduced 
in the 2001 Regulation (Article 12), as well 
as the rules of origin and the overall 
temporality of GSP regulations. In 2002, the 
Commission notified a number of GSP 
beneficiary countries that certain sectors 
would be graduated according to the criteria 
included in the 2001 Regulation20. Although 
this decision applied the stipulated criteria 
more or less correctly (this is open to 
interpretation), these standards seem 
excessively rigid, not taking into account 
changing economic conditions, or the 
possible impact graduation could have on 
poverty21. The rules of origin are criticized as 
                                                          
 
20 See: Official Journal of the European Communities (2002). 
 
21 The European Commission’s analysis –explained in the 
notice cited above and in Council Regulation 815/2003 (8 
May 2003)— is based on data from 1997-1999, “good years” 
being very strict, making it difficult for some 
producers to take advantage of the GSP. One 
of the most cited critiques refers to the short 
period covered by the GSP regulations (3 
years), such that producers in developing 
countries have little incentive to invest in 
new productive sectors (Pacheco, 2003). Is 
it worthwhile to attempt to make technical 
improvements in the GSP? 
 
The fifth reason is that special preferences 
that this scheme offers to the Andean and 
Central American nations –the poorest in 
Latin America— are under attack from other 
developing countries22. They see the “drugs 
regime” as contrary to WTO principles, 
providing special preferences for non trade-
related aspects. Moreover, the argument 
presented by India in a complaint against 
the “GSP drugs” scheme in the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) was accepted by a 
panel in November 200323.  
 
                                                                                   
for most of Latin American economies, while the decision to 
graduate certain sectors was taken  in a period of economic 
recession (2002-2003). Surprisingly, the Regulation did 
exempt Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela, three of the 
region’s richer countries –precisely because they are in 
periods of deep crisis--, while targeting Colombia and Costa 
Rica for graduation. 
 
22 Most of these are in Asia which was not included in the 
original “GSP drugs” scheme despite the important drug 
trade in some countries (i.e., Afghanistan, Burma, Thailand, 
etc.). When Pakistan was included in the December 2001 
Regulation, this set off a number of criticisms in other Asian 
countries, most notably India (see following note), which felt 
certain sectors in which it competes with Pakistan would be 
severely affected by this decision; its conflictive relations with 
this South Asian neighbour was surely another factor. 
However, it is important to note that criticisms have not only 
come from outside the region. In fact, within Latin America, 
the Mercosur countries (Brazil and Paraguay in particular) 
have voiced their disapproval of this scheme which, they 
claim, established an unfair discrimination within the zone 
based on relatively arbitrary political criteria. Moreover, in 
the WTO panel on the “GSP drugs” regime in 2002-2003, 
Paraguay openly supported India’s complaint. 
 
23 See WTO (2003) report. In its complaint, India claimed 
that the special drugs scheme of the EU GSP Regulation 
violates the GATT “enabling clause” (1979 decision on 
differential and more favourable treatment of developing 
countries) because it is discriminatory in favour of some 
countries while preferences should be available to all 
developing countries (unless they receive a special waiver, 
such as that granted for the preferences provided by the EU 
to the ACP group). For its part, the EU argued that India had 
presented a narrow interpretation of the “enabling clause” 
which does –according to the Community—permit differing 
(but not discriminatory) treatment of developing countries. It 
also notes that the scheme responded to the special 
development needs of countries affected by the problems 
related to drug trafficking and production. Andean and 
Central American countries presented their own texts in a 
similar vein. 
 
   
Although this decision was reversed by the 
WTO Appellate Body in April 2004, the 
European Commission will probably have to 
adapt the GSP regulation since the report 
found that the EU’s “drugs arrangements” 
need to be based on objective and trans-
parent criteria that would allow all deve-
loping countries similarly situated to qualify 
for these special preferences. One of the 
implications for Latin American nations cur-
rently benefiting from this scheme is that in 
its latest policy proposal, the European 
Commission (EC, 2004e), it did not include 
a special drugs regime, an acknowledgement 
that it would be incompatible with WTO 
rules. 
 
Despite the WTO ruling, this issue is quite 
complex. Besides the trade-related issues 
which this international body dealt with, 
there is the matter of how preferences may 
affect the production of illegal drugs. Avai-
lable evidence is far from clear, but much of 
it shows impact has not been significant in 
terms of reducing this illicit trade. Accor-
ding to one author (Cline, 2003: 89), from 
1991 to 1999, coca production fell 55 per-
cent in Bolivia and 68 percent in Peru. In 
Colombia, however, it rose 227 percent. In 
evaluating the US Andean Trade Preferences 
Act (ATPA), Cline argues that “the clearest 
instance of a link to ATPA was the increase 
in Peruvian exports of asparagus, a cash 
crop grown near traditional coca areas. In 
contrast, Colombian cut flowers were 
already a major export prior to ATPA, and 
have lost share in ATPA - preference 
imports.” 
 
The links between the EU’s GSP-Drugs 
scheme and increased Andean exports are 
similarly anecdotal, although the Andean 
Community insists that it is one of the 
“main mechanisms through which the Euro-
pean Union contributes to the” fight against 
illegal drugs (Consejo Andino, 2004). In ad-
dition, this sub-regional institution argues 
that the erosion of preferential benefits will 
have a “highly negative impact on illegal tra-
de in our countries”, affecting growth, em-
ployment and development prospects. As a 
political argument it seems convincing, but 
the data supporting this claim is limited. 
Even so, its merits ought to be considered 
seriously in a debate which weighs concerns 
related to trade rules, development impact 
and the need to show visible support for the 
Andean efforts to deal with the drugs trade 
since the EU has continuously expressed its 
commitment to upholding the principle of 
“co-responsibility” (i.e., drug - consuming 
countries must share in the costs of fighting 
this problem).  
 
This brings us to final basis for looking at 
the GSP: it is presently under review by the 
European Union, which must come up with 
and approve a new scheme before July 2005. 
In order to facilitate this process, which 
coincides with complex multilateral nego-
tiations and deep internal changes in the EU 
itself, the Commission (DG Trade, 2003) de-
cide to “roll over” the current GSP Regu-
lation for one year, although the WTO ru-
ling obliges it to implement changes in the 
drugs schemes by 1 July 2005. This decision 
was taken partially because of the uncertain 
fate of the Doha Development Round which 
had originally been expected to close before 
the present regulation expires, but it also 
reflects the EU’s realization that certain as-
pects should be improved, and it needs time 
to evaluate different options. One area 
which requires changes is the graduation 
clause. According to the Commission, in the 
new regulation this will only be adjusted for 
the larger beneficiaries of the GSP in the 
new Regulation. This is a recognition that a 
small number of countries account for the 
largest proportion of GSP imports to the EU 
(see Chapter 6 for more on this). 
 
Despite the evident need for a deep policy 
discussion on the GSP and its possible 
contribution to reducing poverty in Latin 
America, we are also aware that this instru-
ment alone could never be sufficient. That is 
why this paper argues for a better inte-
gration of various development policy tools 
to achieve the goal of alleviating poverty. 
One of these instruments, policy dialogue, 
must be oriented towards helping Latin 
American countries create more adequate 
economic, social and institutional conditions 
to take proper advantage of the oppor-
tunities trade may offer for development. In 
this context, we consider that the emphasis 
that the EU now places on the importance of 
“social cohesion” in the region is a step in 
the right direction. It does, however, run the 
risk of giving the impression that, by con-
ditioning any progress to reform in Latin 
America itself, the EU is shying away from 
undertaking a critical analysis of its own po-
licies towards the region. These issues will 
be addressed in latter sections of this paper. 
   
1.4. LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT 
AND TRADE. A TALE OF CONTINUOUS 
FRUSTRATION 
 
It should now be clear why the issue of the 
Generalised System of Preferences is rele-
vant today, but it is equally important to 
briefly review how Latin America has pro-
gressed, particularly in the area of inter-
national trade. This region is made up of 
primarily middle income countries, so it 
cannot be said to be the neediest area in the 
South. However, this perception is income-
plete and needs to be complemented by a 
deeper review of development reality in La-
tin America. 
 
This is not the place to present an in-depth 
study of Latin America’s development situa-
tion. However, in order to propose viable 
policy options it is useful to highlight some 
aspects which demonstrate the serious chal-
lenges the region faces.  
 
Latin America is a paradox within the deve-
loping world. It is made up of relatively 
well-off countries (when compared to Sub 
Saharan Africa or South Asia), most of 
which are democracies that have been inde-
pendent republics for over a century. Yet, 
democratic institutions in many countries 
remain weak and unstable. Although most of 
Latin America has implemented significant 
economic reforms over the last two decades, 
growth rates are insufficient to reduce 
poverty levels (principally because the gains 
are generally small, discontinuous and 
unequally distributed)24. Despite being rich 
in natural resources (or perhaps because of 
this), Latin America has not been able to 
expand its share of international trade; on 
the contrary, it has been losing out to more 
dynamic economies in Asia and elsewhere. 
Since the economic reforms and liberali-
sation of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
Latin America has been caught in the trap of 
low commodity prices – although export 
volumes have increased quite impressively 
in most countries of the region, this has not 
necessarily been reflected in higher export 
                                                          
24 As Albert Berry (1997: 305) noted --before the current 
crisis began— “it is urgent to achieve better combinations of 
growth and distribution than those of the last two decades.” 
Indeed, the World Bank (de Ferranti, et al, 2003: 2-9) notes 
inequality has generally risen in the region, with some 
notable exceptions (i.e., Brazil): see Figure 2.3 on page 2-10. 
 
earnings25. Generally speaking (and this is 
one of the major puzzles of the Latin Ame-
rican development dilemma), it has not lead 
to the creation of new dynamic sectors nor 
has it generated much employment, which 
would be key to poverty reduction (Ganuza 
et al, 2004). To a large extent the same can 
be said for the boom in foreign direct 
investments in the second half of the 1990s, 
flows which were mostly oriented to services 
and are also subject to wide fluctuations and 
tend to concentrate in a few countries. Fi-
nally, the foreign debt problem has returned 
to the forefront of political concerns in the 
region. 
 
The causes of the poor economic perfor-
mance and social outcomes of the region 
have been widely discussed and analysed. 
Some analysts blame the process of libera-
lisation and the adoption of Washington 
Consensus-type policies in the region since 
the 1980s debt crisis (e.g. Palma, 2003). 
There is certainly no hiding the poor perfor-
mance of Latin America since the appli-
cation of the new set of policies. In Latin 
America, GDP per capita grew by 75% from 
1960-1980, whereas from 1980-1998 it has 
risen only 6%. In the case of Mexico, income 
per capita would have been twice as high 
today if it were not for the growth slowdown 
of the last two decades (Weisbrot, Naiman 
and Kim, 2000).  
 
But the previous policies of import-subs-
titution became unsustainable in the face of 
the debt-crisis.  
 
Indeed, the import-substitution policies bro-
ke down in the 1980s, in the aftermath of 
the debt crisis, and Latin America returned 
towards a more “open” model of develop-
ment. Yet, as we have seen, the subsequent 
results have been disappointing. Contrary to 
the expectations of the proponents of libera-
lisation and globalization, today many 
developing countries (a fortiori Latin Ame-
rican countries) can only achieve sustainable 
current account balances at much lower 
growth rates than before. Thus far from 
removing the external constraint, liberali-
                                                          
25 As noted in Vos et al (2004), trade proved to be a weak 
motor for economic growth in the 1990s, due to its 
insufficient dynamism, increased vulnerability to interna-
tional price fluctuations and poor export performance. Some 
countries, such as Mexico, Chile and Costa Rica did better 
than the rest, but even there the export –growth link was 
fairly tenuous. 
 
   
sation has paradoxically strengthened it. 
UNCTAD economists (1999) ascribe this 
phenomenon to the much greater increase in 
the propensity to import than in the corres-
ponding propensity to export for developing 
countries following trade liberalisation. The-
se countries are consequently much more 
dependent on the external capital inflows to 
achieve the desired rates of growth which 
are compatible with strong employment 
creation and poverty reduction. Yet for most 
countries, under a regime of unregulated 
capital flows, the required inflows are either 
not available or subject to wide fluctuations 
(Singh, 2000:29). As a recent UNCTAD 
(2003c) report succinctly puts it,  
 
“The new policy orientation [in 
Latin America] created new di-
lemmas without resolving the 
old ones; in particular, the re-
gion remained unable to fully 
exploit its export potential and 
therefore continued to depend 
on foreign capital inflows. This 
led to the reappearance of ba-
lance-of-payments and debt pro-
blems similar to those that had 
contributed to the debt crisis in 
the first place”26 
 
In this context, for policy makers in Latin 
America one of the most exasperating as-
pects of the switch towards a liberal trade 
regime has been the lack of a strong link 
between export growth, on the one hand, 
and a rapid expansion in output, produc-
tivity and employment on the other. This is 
true even in countries which have managed 
an impressive expansion of exports, such as 
Chile and Mexico. For Latin America as a 
whole, export growth (in value terms) rea-
ched 10 per cent a year in the 1990s, a 
significant improvement over the 4 per cent 
of the 1980s (Bouzas and Keifman, 2003:  
                                                          
26 The underlying problem is, as Sanchez (2003:1991) 
stresses, the low level of domestic savings: “Many long-
standing observers of the region consider the low level of 
domestic savings to be one of the most serious obstacles to 
the macroeconomic situation in Latin America. Indeed, a 
good number would predictably rank it as the most 
important structural macroeconomic deficiency. Many other 
ills stem from it, in what is an unmistakable chain-link of 
causation: dependence on foreign savings renders policy 
subservient to the requirements of outside investors, which 
leads to pro-cyclical economic policies, sky-high macroeco-
nomic volatility, and closing the vicious circle, reduced 
private domestic savings and long-term investments.” 
Table 7.2).27  Nonetheless, apparently export 
growth has not exercised much impact on 
the overall growth performance (in terms of 
income per capita), and had only a weak 
influence on poverty reduction. 
 
The collapse of the export multiplier has 
been puzzling for researchers. In the case of 
Mexico, Mold and Rozo (2004) ascribe the 
phenomenon to the gradual “hollowing out” 
of domestic industry, provoked by the sprea-
ding of maquila-type practices to the rest of 
the economy (i.e. a heavy dependence on 
imported intermediate products, and little or 
no local value-added). This change in the 
modus operandi of national firms has been 
provoked by, among other things, the way in 
which liberalisation was implemented, with 
a strong emphasis on maquila-type activities, 
and, until 1994, a chronically overvalued na-
tional currency (Lustig, 2001).  
 
Recent research by Gaunza, Morely, Robin-
son (2004), on the other hand, generally 
exonerates the process of trade liberalisation 
for the poor economic results of the region. 
By use of general equilibrium modelling 
techniques for 16 countries in the region, 
the authors simulate the extent to which 
trade reforms have been responsible for the 
slowdown of economic growth, rising ine-
quality and rising poverty observed in many 
parts of Latin America. They conclude that, 
generally speaking, the aggregate effects of 
trade liberalization and further multilateral 
trade integration tend to be mildly positive 
in terms of growth and employment crea-
tion. There is more mixed evidence for the 
poverty effects, but isolating the trade re-
form effects, these tend to be rather small in 
the aggregate.28   
 
To the extent that increases in poverty have 
generally coincided with the economic crises 
which have struck the region, the conclu-
sion of Gaunza et al seems plausible. Macro-
economic mismanagement, rather than trade 
                                                          
27 If we exclude Mexico from the figures, however, the data is 
somewhat less impressive, with only a 7 per cent growth rate 
of exports in value terms.  
 
28 Nonetheless, the methodology used by Ganuza et al. (2004) 
is fairly controversial, especially for deducing real economy 
effects. The modelling simulations are basically dependent 
upon not only the quality of the input-output data sets, but 
also key assumptions regarding elasticities, returns to scale, 
competition, etc. As a result, they have proved to be less than 
satisfactory for predicting outcomes. For critiques of these 
models, see Dunkley (2004) or Panagariya (2002).  
   
liberalisation per se, would be one of the 
prime culprits for the deterioration or sta-
gnation in living standards. Massive deva-
luations caused inflationary surges because 
indispensable imports now cost much more 
in the local currency. Central banks raised 
interest rates in efforts to stabilize the ex-
change rate and fight inflation, slowing 
down economic growth in the process. 
Unemployment rose and government reve-
nues fell, leading to expenditure cuts (since 
budgets were not allowed to go very far out 
of balance even in a recession) that rein-
forced market dynamics. These dynamics 
results in economic growth at half the pace 
registered under ISI (Stallings and Perez, 
2000:90). Nonetheless, to the extent that 
trade liberalisation was part and parcel of 
the package of policy reforms thrust on the 
continent in the aftermath of the debt crisis, 
it is perhaps difficult to extricate trade po-
licy from blame (as Gaunza et al (2004) do).  
 
Latin America has traditionally been well-
known for its pessimistic views on export-
led growth. Although most orthodox econo-
mists would deny it, that pessimism is fairly 
well founded. The terms of trade have gene-
rally been highly unfavourable to Latin 
American countries. Although recently there 
has been an up-turn in commodity prices, 
the non-oil exporting countries of Latin 
America suffered a deterioration in their 
terms of trade of -14.9% over the period 
1998-2002, with the hardest hit of all being 
Peru (-22.7%) and Chile (-17.5%).  Despite 
the fact that the region has a longer history 
of industrialisation than sub-Saharan Africa 
or South Asia, many Latin American coun-
tries still have a pronounced dependence on 
primary commodities. Primary commodities 
account for more than half of all exports 
from Latin America (51%), surpassed only 
by sub-Saharan Africa (57%). The degree of 
dependence on primary commodities is es-
pecially high for the poorest Latin American 
countries, such as Paraguay (80%), Bolivia 
(71%) or Nicaragua (92%). Even Chile, of-
ten portrayed as a model of export-led 
growth for other countries in the region to 
follow, still depends heavily on primary 
exports (81%)29. Over the long term, a struc-
turally-excessive dependence on primary 
commodities and the corresponding shifts in 
                                                          
29 Although Chile has also shown that this is not, at least until 
now, incompatible with being increasingly competitive 
internationally. 
 
the terms of trade more than wipe out any 
advantages from preferential tariff regimes. 
 
That said it should be recognised that Me-
xico and some of the Caribbean countries 
have achieved a notable degree of diver-
sification in recent years. Mexico in par-
ticular has achieved a remarkably dramatic 
diversification, from a situation wherein oil 
accounted to approximately 80 percent of 
export earnings in 1982, to the inverse situa-
tion now, when manufacturing products 
contribute 84 percent of total export ear-
nings. In general, the experience of Mexico 
and the Central American countries differs 
from the rest of Latin America in the sense 
that they have benefited from privileged 
access to the US market – in the case of 
Mexico, through the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), operational 
since 1994, and in the case of the Caribbean 
countries, through the Caribbean Basin Ini-
tiative (CBI), in force since 198330.  
 
Nonetheless, although these agreements ha-
ve been successful in promoting trade per se, 
they have not been so successful in provi-
ding a catalyst to broad based economic 
growth. The situation in Mexico has been 
particularly striking – in the space of fifteen 
years, Mexico has managed to convert itself 
into one of the ten leading exporters in the 
world, with exports o 164 billion US$ in 
2002. This is ahead even of that much cited 
example of export promotion, South Korea. 
This is an astounding success for a country 
that, in the 1980s, had widely become 
regarded as the basket-case economy of 
Latin America. Yet income growth has been 
extremely sluggish during this period and, 
according to the Commission set up by 
President Fox to evaluate the levels of 
poverty, “the absolute number of people 
below the poverty line increased from 19.1 
million to 23.8 million between 1992 and 
                                                          
30 NAFTA is, of course, not a preferential agreement but a 
regional free trade one. Generally speaking, even when 
granting preferential (i.e. non-reciprocal) access, the United 
States usually conditions inclusion into its scheme upon 
adherence to a set of demands, such as capital account 
liberalisation, privatization, etc. Thus, for instance, the Afri-
can Growth and Opportunity Act requires signatory coun-
tries to ‘make progress towards market-based economies, 
strengthening the rule of law, eliminating barriers to US trade 
and investment, protecting intellectual property, combating 
corruption, protecting human rights, and eliminating certain 
child labour practices (Cline, 2003:91). In this sense, United 
States preferential agreements are not developmental in the 
way that EU ones are – they come with considerable strings 
attached.   
   
2000, an increase of 4.7 million persons” 
(Cortés et al, 2002:15).    
 
In sum, Latin American development has 
been fraught with obstacles, some domestic 
and others external. This region has certain 
advantages with regards to other developing 
areas, but it is far from being able to resolve 
its problems autonomously. The United 
States is Latin America’s main, natural part-
ner, but the region needs to diversify its fo-
reign ties in order to avoid excessive depen-
dence. In this area, the European Union is 
key. The question is: will the EU respond 
accordingly? The next chapter examines this 
issue. 
 
1.5. LATIN AMERICAN TIES WITH THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
 
When analysing the GSP, it is necessary to 
review overall bi-regional trade relations. 
Reflecting the depth of the Latin American 
debt crisis, EU-Latin American commerce 
increased only slightly during the 1980s, 
rising from 32 billion euros in 1980 to 43 
billion in 1990. The 1990s, on the contrary, 
were quite dynamic as trade between these 
two regions exceeded 100 billion euros in 
2001, rising again to 111 billion euros in 
2002.  
 
 
 
Table 3 
European Union Trade with Latin America/LA (Billions of ecu/euro and %) 
 
 1980 1990 2001 2003 
Imports from LA 17.8 27.0 52.0 50.0 
  Share of EU Total Imports (%) 6.5 6.2 5.6 5.7 
Exports to LA 14.2 16.9 58.0 44.0 
  Share of EU Total Exports (%) 7.0 4.3 6.7 5.2 
TRADE BALANCE -3.6 -10.1 6.1 -6.0 
 
SOURCE: European Commission, DG Trade. 
 
 
However, this positive evolution in absolute 
terms masked a negative situation when this 
trade is compared with broader tendencies. 
One disturbing trend is that --in relative 
terms— Latin America has steadily become 
less and less important as a trading partner 
for the European Union. As a supplier to the 
EU, Latin America fell from 6.2% to 5.6% 
between 1990 and 200, improving only 
slightly since then (See Table 3). As a 
market for EU exports, this region has also 
declined in relevance from 1980 when it 
reached 7.0% until 2001 when it represented 
6.7% (falling once again in 2003, to 5.2%). 
From Latin America’s perspective, the EU 
has also fallen in importance as a destination 
for exports, from close to 30% in 1990 to 
only 13% in 2001, although it continues to 
be its second largest partner.31 
 
                                                          
31 These trends are confirmed in a recent study by the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB, 2004), which includes 
more recent data and in-depth analysis. This report points 
out that this is mostly true even if Mexico is excluded from 
analysis (p. 7). 
In other words, while Latin exports to the 
world quadrupled in the 1990s, sales to the 
EU only managed to double in volume. This 
situation reflects a series of factors. Firstly, 
there is a clear trend towards the growing 
regionalization of trade within the Americas 
(a characteristic of intra-EU trade patterns 
for some decades). This has been one of the 
results of a network of bilateral and sub-
regional free trade agreements signed over 
the past decade and a half. Secondly, Latin 
America’s export offer to the EU –one 
quarter of which is in agricultural pro-
ducts— is concentrated in sectors whose 
prices have been falling in international 
markets. Related to this last point is a third 
factor: the limited success of efforts by Latin 
American countries to diversify into higher 
added-value and/or niche products. To be 
fair, though, --this would be the fourth 
factor— international competition is increa-
singly intense in numerous products where 
this region had or could have a certain 
comparative advantage.  
 
   
Three examples serve to illustrate this 
difficulty. One is coffee, the world price for 
which has fallen dramatically as a result of 
new entries in this export market (such as 
Vietnam), provoking heavy losses (and so-
cial instability) in several Latin American 
countries where this was traditionally an im-
portant source of hard currency and where 
whole areas are organised around the coffee 
economy. Diversifying requires a fundamen-
tal cultural change in these zones. Another 
example is cut flowers, a niche which Co-
lombia managed to develop and lead –in 
competition with the Netherlands and 
Israel— but recently its share has fallen be-
cause of new competitors. Finally, several 
studies have noted that new illegal coca and 
poppy plantations in the Andes are replacing 
traditional and new crops in some zones. In 
fact, there is evidence that drug production 
has risen despite various repressive policies 
and incentives such as those provided by the 
GSP drugs scheme32.  
 
How did Latin American exports to the EU 
fare in relation to other developing regions? 
Table 4 shows that Latin America increased 
its exports by 180% since 1980. This placed 
the region in an intermediate position, be-
tween the dynamic exporters of Asia and the 
Mediterranean and the non-competitive 
countries in the Africa, Caribbean and Paci-
fic (ACP) group (excluding South Africa 
which showed a performance similar to La-
tin America). As a group, the Least Develo-
ped Countries performed worse than Latin 
America. Within this zone, the Andes sub-
region demonstrated rates of growth only 
slightly above those of the ACP, while Cen-
tral America was one of the most dynamic 
sub-regions, although in absolute terms its 
exports are relatively insignificant. 
 
What is surprising to note is that the trend 
of declining EU-Latin American trade has 
taken place during a period when the EU 
has been relatively active in promoting 
closer economic ties with the region. This 
has been evident at several levels: 
 
• The signing of Association agreements, 
including free trade, with Mexico and Chile, 
and the ongoing negotiations with the Mer-
cosur countries which are set to conclude in 
October 2004; 
                                                          
32 See, for instance, study by TNI (2002). 
 
• An increase in the amount and variety of 
instruments for economic co-operation33, 
including AL-INVEST, Eurocentres, and 
support for regional integration schemes, 
etc; 
 
• A growing amount of EU foreign direct 
investments in Latin America, reaching 39 
billion euros in 2000. Overall FDI stock 
from the EU member states in this region 
represented some 11.3% of the total invested 
abroad; 
 
• An increasing concentration of bi-regional 
policy fora (i.e., EU-Rio Group ministerial 
meetings) on economic issues; and 
 
• The introduction of a more generous trade 
preference regime first for the Andean coun-
tries and later extended to Central America, 
with the express purpose of encouraging 
legal exports to the EU in order to reduce 
incentives for illicit drug trafficking. 
 
However, this relatively positive policy 
framework has not contributed to improving 
the level of Latin American access to EU 
markets overall, and particularly in the case 
of the poorer countries. 
 
Indeed, with regards to EU trade policy 
initiatives in Latin America, a clear tendency 
has emerged favouring richer partners. 
While free trade agreements have been 
signed with Mexico and Chile, and nego-
tiations are in progress with the Mercosur 
countries, the rest of the region –the poorer 
countries— have been put “on hold” 
supposedly because they are “not ready” for 
a full trade partnership with the EU 
(although, surprisingly, Syria –a dictatorship 
with no history of regional integration— is 
considered “ready”). In any case, for the 
Andean and Central American countries, the 
GSP is all that is available until the two 
conditions established at the Guadalajara 
Summit are satisfied34. 
                                                          
33 According to European Commission data, over 220 million 
euro will have been spent on “trade-related assistance” to 
Latin America between 1997 and 2006. 
 
34 Those conditions are: (1) that regional integration in both 
cases demonstrates clear advances, particularly in terms of 
consolidating common markets, and (2) that negotiations 
will depend on what happens with the WTO Doha Round. 
  
Table 4 
EU Imports from Selected Developing Regions (billions of ecu/euros) 
 
     Change  
Regions/Countries 1980 1990 2001* 2003 (1980- 2001/03)  
ACP (including S. Africa) 28,6 27,9 47,5   66,1%  
  South Africa 6,9 7,5 15,6   126,1%  
ASEM** 27,0 89,0   245,0 807,4%  
  China     81,6 105,0    
Latin America 17,8 27,1 52,0 50,0 180,9%  
   Andean Community 5,0 4,8 8,5   70,0%  
   Central America 1,1 1,7 3,4   209,1%  
   Mercosur     25,8 25,8    
Mediterranean*** 14,7 27,7 66,8   354,4%  
Least Developed Countries 6,1 7,1 14,3   134,4%  
 
SOURCE: Prepared by authors from: European Commission DG Trade data base 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/data.htm). 
*Year for Andean Community, Mediterranean countries, South Africa and LDCs is 2002. 
** ASEM: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, China, Japan and South Korea. 
*** Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and Jericho, Cyprus, Malta and 
Turkey. 
 
 
 
These are also the countries where EU deve-
lopment assistance for Latin America has 
been concentrated. However, it should be 
noted that co-operation flows from the EU 
stagnated in the 1990s. Indeed, while the 
annual average of aid from the Community 
and the 15 member states in 1992-1996 rea-
ched 2.26 billion dollars, in the following 
five-year period, it fell to just above 1.8 
billion dollars; roughly two thirds of this 
was distributed among the Andean and 
Central American nations. 
 
Fortunately, there has been a greater focus 
in EU aid on reducing poverty and promo-
ting social cohesion. These concerns are 
fairly well-integrated into the country, sub-
regional and regional strategy papers. In this 
line, the Commission placed social cohesion 
at the forefront of the agenda for the bi-
regional summit in Guadalajara, Mexico. 
 
Against this backdrop, EU-Latin American 
trading relations have been permeated with 
tensions over the last twenty years or so. 
Many Latin American countries have felt 
prejudiced by the EU's more favourable 
treatment of lower income developing coun-
tries in its trade policies. The Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been a major 
bone of contention. As a net agricultural 
exporting region, Latin America has a vested  
 
interest in seeing the reduction or elimi-
nation to restrictions for agricultural im-
ports. One study by the World Bank (2001) 
concluded that the overall costs of the CAP 
in terms of lost market shares and lower 
prices were highest for Latin America, losing 
$4 billion annually from EU farm policies 
alone. The impacts were estimated to be 
particularly damaging for Argentina and 
Uruguay, for whom the EU's CAP depresses 
terms of trade by 7 and 8 per cent respect-
tively. It is not coincidental that, of the new 
block of twenty-one developing countries 
(the so-called G-21) that emerged just 
before the WTO ministerial meeting in Sep-
tember 2003 in Cancun, Mexico, no less 
than 12 of them were Latin American. 
 
Finally, it is important to underline the fact 
that Latin America’s trade relations with the 
EU are closely interlinked with its commer-
cial ties with the US. Thus, Washington’s 
policy initiatives in Latin America are follo-
wed closely in Brussels and other European 
capitals. Although the EU acknowledges its 
inherent disadvantage vis-à-vis the US (i.e, 
with regards to distance), the EU makes eve-
ry effort to avoid losing its “market share” in 
Latin America. For this region, this compe-
tition is useful in diversifying its external 
trade. With respect to trade preferences, 
both the US and the EU provided similar 
   
schemes until recently, including special re-
gimes for drug-producing countries in Latin 
America. However, lately, the United States 
seems to be taking a more decisive approach 
in winding down in unilateral preferential 
systems for the region, as it favour free trade 
agreements; these were recently signed with 
Chile and Central American countries and 
negotiations are in progress with some An-
dean countries. This changing panorama in 
Latin America will make it increasingly hard 
for the EU to continue to base its trade rela-
tions with close to a dozen countries on pre-
ferences whose benefits are steadily eroding 
(and will probably continue to do so with 
the proposed regime for after 2005). 
 
 
 
2.  The EU's GSP and 
Poverty in Latin America 
 
 
2.1. OVERVIEW OF EU TRADE POLICY 
TOWARDS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
The European Union is the largest trading 
block in the world and the largest trader 
with developing countries. As such, it is a 
key actor in determining the extent to which 
poorer countries are integrated in the world 
economy.  
 
However, EU external trade policies are not 
primarily shaped by these facts. Instead they 
are mostly determined or constrained by 
internal goals of the Community. In its early 
years, there were no special considerations 
for developing countries, but over time a 
fragmented policy framework emerged. The 
main division in that structure was between 
associated partners –mainly the countries of 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), 
and later the Mediterranean countries— and 
non-associated countries (Asia and Latin 
America). 
 
An important factor to bear in mind and 
which explains why EU policy has been fun-
damentally driven by internal interests is 
that trade with developing countries was 
never “critical [ ] to the macroeconomic 
well-being of the Community, nor to its 
security” (Grilli, 1993: 140). In fact, apart 
from oil imports, the relevance of trade with 
developing countries has tended to diminish 
over the past decades. When a particular 
sector of the EU was deemed at risk, the 
policy orientation of the Union was to im-
plement defensive measures (i.e., the CAP).  
 
For those countries that did not pose a 
threat and for which there were strong 
political interests, the policy of the EU was 
to provide compensatory trade concessions. 
These were first provided to the associates, 
mostly former colonies in Africa (later 
expanded to the Caribbean and the Pacific) 
through the successive Yaoundé and Lomé 
conventions. These agreements provided du-
ty-free access to most products on a contrac-
tual basis, in addition to measures to com-
pensate for price fluctuations in certain sec-
tors. These countries were at the top of the 
“pyramid of privilege”, the Mediterranean 
countries were in the middle and the Latin 
American and Asian countries were at the 
bottom. EU policy for these last two regions 
was to provide a “one-size-fits-all”, unila-
terally-designed, market access regime, the 
Generalised System of Preferences, created 
in 1971. Since then, the GSP has gone 
through a series of reforms. Perhaps the 
most relevant changes took place in the 
1990s, with the introduction of the special 
scheme for countries affected by illegal nar-
cotics trafficking and production, the social 
and environmental incentives and the EBA 
regime for the poorest countries. The conso-
lidation of disparate frameworks in a single 
regulation in 2001, including the contro-
versial “graduation clause”, was one of the 
latest major changes. 
 
In sum, trade treatment by the Community 
for developing countries was highly 
differentiated by regions. This functioned 
reasonably well (from the EU perspective), 
but it created a series of conflicts between or 
even within regions as governments 
complained to Brussels that other countries 
or groups received better treatment. 
 
In the 1990s a process of relative conver-
gence in EU trade policy for developing 
countries began to take shape. This was a 
result of several factors. One was that the 
web of instruments was increasingly com-
plex to manage. Secondly, as a result of the 
completion of the GATT Uruguay Round in 
1994, many aspects of this policy needed to 
be adapted to a new global trade context. In 
relation to this, there was clear erosion in 
the value of the various preferential regimes 
on offer. Thirdly, in a context of increased 
   
global competition, interest in North-South 
free trade agreements rose, particularly after 
the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) became operative in January 1994.  
 
Finally, the overall review of the Commu-
nity’s development policy needed to be 
integrated with the emerging trade policy in 
order to maintain a minimum level of cohe-
rence, a demand included in the Treaty of 
the European Union (TEU) itself. For this 
purpose, the Commission’s communication 
on development policy (CEC, 2000) under-
lined the need to use the three policy instru-
ments at its disposal –trade, aid and 
dialogue— such that they mutually reinforce 
each other, always with the ultimate goal of 
reducing poverty. As one of six priority a-
reas, trade policy received considerable 
attention in this document. In this context, 
the EU called for a more just and fair mul-
tilateral trading system and, in its bilateral 
ties with developing countries, it promised 
to introduce measures to improve market 
access and increase efforts to promote re-
gional integration. 
 
Nevertheless, this document’s orientation 
was focussed on development cooperation 
rather than on other policy tools. The link 
between trade and development was more 
explicitly addressed in another communi-
cation in September 2002 (CEC, 2002). Its 
objective was to “spell out the way the EU 
can fulfil its global commitments in support 
of the efforts of developing countries to 
better reap the benefits of trade and invest-
ment”. The main premise of that Com-
mission document is that “trade can foster 
growth and poverty reduction and be an im-
portant catalyst for sustainable develop-
ment”. This is only possible, as it correctly 
argues, when trade is “part of a wider, coun-
try-owned strategy”. It also noted the need 
to integrate three types of strategies in order 
to ensure trade contributes more to growth 
and development: (1) sound macroeconomic 
policies, effective economic and social go-
vernance, human capital development and 
regional integration; (2) better market access 
and balanced trade rules; and (3) trade-
related assistance and capacity building to 
help developing countries with these tasks. 
In sum, the solution to development chal-
lenges involves a combination of efforts by 
developing countries and the EU, bilaterally 
and through the multilateral system.  
 
In the area of market access, the Com-
mission recognized that preferences “have 
not always been used to the full”, so it pro-
mised to work to achieve “more compre-
hensive use” of the GSP. These general prin-
ciples were accompanied by analysis of the 
link between trade and development as well 
as a series of concrete proposals for action 
with regards to policy dialogue and enhan-
cing effectiveness of EU and multilateral 
support.  
 
With regards to this last area, the inter DG 
Task Force for Trade and Development was 
set up to improve coherence and assist in 
mainstreaming trade issues in the Country 
and Regional Strategy Papers (CSPs/RSPs). 
In May 2003, based on a broad consultation 
between the various departments involved, 
it presented a pioneering text providing 
guidelines for trade-related assistance/TRA 
(CEC, 2003c) --including both support for 
long term capacity building and short term 
technical assistance--. Several new program-
mes have been initiated in this area, with a 
particular focus on the ACP group, although 
there are some actions in Latin America35. 
 
All of these initiatives were to be taken for-
ward through multilateral and bilateral 
actions. On the global level, the EU was one 
of the main promoters of a new round in the 
WTO focused on development concerns, 
which was materialized in the Doha Deve-
lopment Agenda in November 2001. In 
addition to concerns about strengthening 
the multilateral trade regime, this interest 
came in response to the complaints by many 
poorer countries that the rich nations had 
not kept their side of the bargain in the 
earlier round, resulting in insufficient access 
to their markets, particularly for agricultural 
goods.  
 
However, the failure of the WTO ministerial 
conference in Cancun in September 2003 
reflected a series of unresolved tensions 
between rich and poor countries as well as 
this multilateral organisation’s structural 
limitations. As a result, the UE decided to 
                                                          
35 One example is a 5 million euro programme in Bolivia 
which intends to improve trade and investment flows with 
the EU through a variety of actions. The overall objective 
cites the reduction of poverty as one goal. Among the factors 
in the context cited to justify this initiative is that Bolivia has 
not been able to increase its exports to the EU despite 
benefiting from the GSP drugs scheme. This programme was 
evaluated in early 2004 (ADE, 2004). 
 
   
re-evaluate its strategy. In November 2003 it 
produced a new communication aimed at 
reviving multilateral negotiations (CEC, 
2003b). A meeting between the Trade Com-
missioner and representatives of the G20 
group of developing countries in Brazil lead 
to a joint communiqué in favour of restar-
ting talks in early 2004. 
 
Among the lessons which the European 
Commission found in the Cancun expe-
rience is that “preferential access for the 
weakest of the developing countries [..] can 
be vital for their integration in world 
markets” (CEC, 2003b: 7). But, at the same 
time it launched an implicit criticism 
(several times) of “special and differential 
treatment” which it sees as ineffective. 
Nevertheless, the EU also suggests that the 
middle-income developing countries might 
consider providing preferences to the least 
advanced nations. These ideas point to and 
reflect a shift in the orientation of the EU 
preferential regime –mentioned in the 
October 2003 press release on this topic— 
to aim benefits mostly at the poorest 
countries.  
 
This new focus also meshed well with the 
WTO decision on the GSP, formally adopted 
by the Dispute Settlement Body on April 20, 
2004. This body found that the EU “could 
differentiate among beneficiaries provided 
such preferences are based on objective and 
transparent criteria and are made available 
to all similarly-situated developing coun-
tries” (Apea, 2004:4). The decision also 
obliged the EU to bring the special drug 
arrangements into conformity with its WTO 
obligations. Since there was no agreement 
between the parties on when the EU should 
comply with this, an arbitrator was chosen 
and he gave the Commission until July 1, 
2005 (WTO, 2004: 27). 
 
As a result, the Commission began an inter-
nal reflection on reforming the GSP as a 
whole, which lead to a Communication in 
July 2004 (CE 2004e), establishing guide-
lines for that process which would end with 
a new regulation which should enter into 
force on January 1, 2006. This Commu-
nication developed the following main ideas: 
 
• The GSP is one of the key instruments to 
assist developing countries in reducing 
poverty; 
• This preferential system is part of a wide 
set of trade policy priorities, including 
the “Doha Agenda”, aimed at developing 
countries; 
• The regime must be “stable, predictable, 
objective and simple”, building on past 
experience and reducing the number of 
arrangements; 
• Preferences must be targeted on the 
countries that most need it and should 
encourage regional cooperation; 
• The goal of promoting sustainable 
development must be more prominent 
through a single set of additional con-
cessions based on acceptance and imple-
mentation of international conventions 
relating to social rights, environmental 
protection and governance, including 
the fight against drugs. 
 
The July 2004 guidelines recognized that 
efforts to promote development and era-
dicate poverty needed to be stepped up and 
that part of the solution required enhancing 
“the effectiveness of external trade policy 
instruments, such as the GSP” (EC, 2004e: 
4). In this line, the Commission’s own re-
view found that GSP imports had not risen 
as fast as overall imports in the 1990s.  
 
On October 20, 2004, based on these guide-
lines, the Commission adopted a formal 
policy proposal setting out the details of the 
new EU GSP for the period 2006-2008 (EC, 
2004f). This proposal introduces several 
important changes. First, it reduces the pre-
sent five schemes to three: the general 
scheme, set to incorporate 300 additional 
products; the EBA; and a new “special 
GSP+” for “vulnerable countries with special 
development needs”. To benefit from this 
last scheme –this is a sort of “add-on” to the 
first two schemes—  countries must meet a 
number of criteria, including the ratification 
and effective application of 27 international 
conventions. These countries must also de-
monstrate they are “small beneficiaries” 
(that GSP-covered imports represent less 
than 1% of total EU GSP imports) and that 
their economies are “poorly diversifies” (five 
largest sectors of GSP-covered imports re-
present more than 75% of its total GSP 
imports). 
 
A second set of innovations related to the 
mechanism for graduation which is “sim-
plified”. A single criterion (share of Commu-
   
nity market expressed as a share of pre-
ferential imports –up to 50%-- for a given 
group of products) will be applied instead of 
the present complex mechanism. Finally, 
the Commission will introduce changes to 
make the rules of origin more flexible, in 
particular with the aim of enhancing region-
nal accumulation (that a given proportion of 
the origin of a product can be regional and 
not just national in order to take advantage 
of GSP benefits). 
 
While this policy change is generally posi-
tive it ignores an intense controversy that 
has recently taken place amongst develop-
ment economists as to the benefits/costs of a 
policy of trade preferences. Most liberal 
economists oppose preferences granted to 
poorer developing countries, on the grounds 
that it undermines the system of multilateral 
liberalisation. The World Bank, for instance, 
has argued that "nonreciprocal preferences 
like GSP are a "Faustian bargain". The basic 
criticism is that the GSP is anti-trade and 
that, on balance, the system actually delays a 
poor country's efforts to liberalise. Trade 
diversion effects may be larger than the 
benefits from trade creation between the two 
bilateral partners involved in the preferential 
agreement, especially if the rules of origin 
are excessively strict. It may also engender 
deterioration in the quality of the trade 
between two countries, artificially shifting 
economic activity towards sectors where 
trade preferences exist, but out of line with 
the country’s long-term comparative advan-
tage. In addition, once benefits are lifted, or 
eroded by tariff reduction with competing 
countries, the costs of adjustment are 
inevitably high.36  
 
Using a gravity model econometric speci-
fication, Rose (2002) reaches the conclusion 
that the GSP approximately doubled the 
volume of trade between signing partners 
This is of course exactly the opposite view to 
which orthodox economists would usually 
subscribe, and suggests that, far from being 
                                                          
36 Bangladesh is commonly cited as an example of this. The 
EU provides preferential market access for Bangladesh’s 
garment exports, exempting them from its 12.5 percent 
import tariff. At the beginning of the 1980s, garment exports 
were practically negligible. In the intervening twenty years, 
the industry has grown to contribute approximately $4 
billion a year to the balance of payments. However, with the 
imminent phasing out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement 
(MFA) in 2005, Bangladesh’s garment industry will face full-
fledged competition from other low-cost producers like 
China, India or Turkey. 
damaging, bilateral mechanisms of trade 
concessions might actually contribute to 
export growth and, by implication, poverty 
reduction. 
 
In short, although Rose’s heterodox findings 
concerning the impact of the GSP on trade 
volumes are suggestive, they are incon-
clusive. With the interaction of so many 
different factors and the difficulty of cap-
turing the essence of an overall trade regime 
in a few variables, it is perhaps doubtful that 
any single cross-sectional time series study 
resolves the issue definitively. Bearing this in 
mind, this study limits its scope to more 
detailed, country-level, data, focusing parti-
cularly on low-income countries of Latin 
America. In addition, because of the possi-
bility of a disjuncture between trade growth 
and poverty reduction, we explore some of 
the plausible links between these two 
variables.   
 
This new scheme seems to be more in line 
with a poverty reduction focus, but it may 
create problems for middle income countries 
(MICs) where a significant proportion of the 
population are also living in poverty. This is 
particularly worrisome since there has 
already been a clear trend in foreign aid dis-
tribution away from this group of nations 
(basing cut-offs primarily on the GDP per 
capita indicator).  
 
Moreover, this policy trend may have signi-
ficant strategic costs. The possible “gra-
duation” of Latin American countries that 
are not offered the alternative of a free trade 
agreement with the European Union will 
enhance the current tendency in that region 
–not out of choice but because it is seen as 
the only option— to strengthen commercial 
links with the United States, reducing even 
further the EU’s economic presence in the 
region.  
 
 
2.2. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S GSP AND 
LATIN AMERICA 
 
From a developmental standpoint, Latin 
American countries have received prefe-
rential access to the European market within 
the framework of the GSP since 1971. The 
coverage rate of the EU GSP is very 
comprehensive: over 99 per cent of imports 
from developing countries of products that 
   
are subject to duties in the EU are eligible 
for preferences. Within the framework of the 
GSP, the EU has granted the Andean coun-
tries special preferential access conditions 
(exemption or reduction of tariffs) since 
December 13, 1990. These additional 
clauses were added for Andean countries 
committed to tackling drug production and 
trafficking. The scheme remained unchan-
ged until December 31, 1994 when the EU 
presented a new "Multi-annual Scheme of 
Generalised Tariff Preferences" (GSP) to the 
Andean Countries for a ten-year period, 
1995-2004 (CEC, 2003c). The scheme was 
also extended to Venezuela and the Central 
American countries and, as of 2002, to 
Pakistan. 
 
A rigorous examination of trade effects 
should focus on products where the margin 
of preference (exemption from tariff and 
non-tariff barriers) is large (e.g. fisheries, 
clothing and fruit and clothing), and on 
countries that have not strongly discrimi-
nated against exports. It should also be 
remembered that the trade stimulating effect 
of preferences is provided by the effective 
tariff rate (including the tariff equivalent of 
non-tariff barriers from which the bene-
ficiary is exempt), and not just by the no-
minal rate (McQueen, 1998:427).  
 
 
Graph 1 
EU imports from Latin America using GSP preferences, 1997-2002 
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SOURCE: Prepared by authors on the basis of data provided by DG Trade, European Commission. 
 
 
 
However, the data available does show a no-
ticeable concentration (69% in 1997-2002) 
of Latin America’s exports to the EU in the 
four largest economies (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico), which have also bene-
fited from the GSP. The Andean and Central 
American nations seem to have utilised 
these preferences fairly effectively (an an-
nual average of 76% and 69% respectively in 
the period 1997-2002), but so have the ri-
cher countries in the region. In fact, Argen-
tina, Brazil and Chile alone accounted for a-
bout half of the EU GSP imports from Latin 
America in 2001-2002 (up from 40% in 
1999-2000). However, the region as a whole 
has seen its GSP benefits fall over the past 
decade (see Graph 1) both in absolute (a fall 
from almost 10 billion euros in 1997 to 7 
billion in 2002) and relative terms (declines 
in the utilisation rate from 71% to 62% and 
the utility rate —GSP imports/total im-
ports— from 32% to 15%), as can be seen in 
Graph 2. 
 
   
Graph 2. Latin America-EU GSP imports, 1997-2002 
0
2.000.000
4.000.000
6.000.000
8.000.000
10.000.000
12.000.000
14.000.000
16.000.000
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
G
SP
 Im
po
rt
s 
(1
00
0 
eu
ro
s)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
U
til
iz
at
io
n/
U
til
ity
 ra
te
GSP Imports
Utilization Rate
Utility Rate
 
SOURCE: Prepared by authors on the basis of data provided by DG Trade, European Commission. 
 
 
 
From its inception, the EU’s GSP scheme 
received criticisms from Latin American 
countries on a number of grounds:   
 
• It was argued that the GSP offered 
few real additional benefits to tra-
ding partners, due to the exclusion 
of most agriculture products;  
• It was criticised for not offering suf-
ficient tariff reductions for certain 
manufacturing goods (particularly 
labour intensive goods like textiles):  
• It does not resolve the problems 
associated with non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs);  
• The GSP has apparently done little 
to encourage structural diversify-
cation;  
• Finally, there have been many com-
plaints regarding the lack of trans-
parency in the application of GSP 
rules (Sanahuja, 2000:6).  
 
In addition, for many Latin American coun-
tries, the GSP represents an unfavourable 
treatment vis-à-vis the EU's Association A-
greements with the Mediterranean countries, 
or the signatories of the Lomé and Cotonou 
Agreements. Certainly, analyses of how tra-
de patterns have subsequently evolved in La-
tin America since the granting of preferences 
hardly revindicate the role of the GSP. With 
regard to the GSP-drug regime, an in-depth 
study by Nieto (2002) of the trading rela-
tions between the Andean countries (Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) 
and the EU reveals that, whereas exports of 
products to the rest of the world included 
under the Andean GSP+ agreement grew by 
30% between 1998 and 2000, exports from 
the Andean countries to the EU grew by 
only 8.7% over the same period.      
 
This kind of information is in fact common-
place in the literature on the effectiveness of 
EU trading preferences. It is often, for exam-
ple, taken as a damming indictment of EU 
trading preferences that, despite enjoying 
very significant preferences, the exports of 
the ACP countries to the EU market has 
fallen from 6.7% of world exports in 1975 to 
2.7% in 1995 (Buster, 2002: 104). Caution 
needs to be exercised in interpreting this 
data, however. To some extent, it would be 
misleading to compare the GSP-drugs coun-
try exports with the much better perfor-
mance of developing countries as a group, in 
part because a major part of the increment 
in non-oil exports from developing coun-
tries is due to the success in promoting ma-
nufacturing exports from a small handful of 
countries (principally, China, South Korea, 
Mexico, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia and 
Indonesia). An examination of trade effects 
should therefore focus on products where 
the margin of preference (exemption from 
tariff and non-tariff barriers) is large (e.g. 
   
fisheries, clothing and fruit and clothing), 
and on countries that have not strongly 
discriminated against exports. It should also 
be remembered that the trade stimulating 
effect of preferences is provided by the 
effective tariff rate (including the tariff 
equivalent o non-tariff barriers from which 
the beneficiary is exempt), and not just by 
the nominal rate (McQueen, 1998:427).  
 
 
Table 5 
GSP for Latin American and Caribbean Countries, 2002 (millions of euro %) 
 Total 
Imports 
Eligible 
Imports 
Preferential 
Imports 
Utilisation 
rate 
Utility Rate
Argentina 1862 1698 1333 79 72 
Bahamas 67 67 1 1 1 
Belize 7 7 - 0 0 
Bolivia 11 11 9 81 81 
Brazil 5282 3392 2530 75 48 
Costa Rica 440 439 385 88 88 
Cuba 206 205 185 90 90 
Chile 858 514 432 84 50 
Dominican Republic 148 148 4 3 3 
Ecuador 318 317 269 85 85 
El Salvador 19 19 8 39 39 
Guatemala 119 119 94 79 79 
Guyana 10 10 - 0 0 
Haiti 4 4 2 48 48 
Honduras 93 92 77 84 83 
Jamaica 96 96 2 2 2 
Mexico 2670 2599 105 4 4 
Nicaragua 27 27 23 85 85 
Panama 42 42 27 64 64 
Paraguay 21 21 13 62 62 
Peru 405 404 377 93 93 
Suriname 26 25 2 8 8 
Trinidad and Tobago 402 379 25 7 6 
Uruguay 143 134 97 72 68 
      
Total (Latin 
America) 
13351 10843 5999 55 44 
Total (World) 155845 99099 52822 53 34 
 
SOURCE: Calculated from data provided by DG-Trade. The data excludes some small island economies. 
 
 
 
Regrettably, the required data for such an in-
depth analysis was not available at the time 
of the writing up of the current study37. 
However, Table 5 reveals the calculations of 
utilization and utility rates for Latin America 
based on the most recent data available by  
                                                          
37 This is a problem faced by other researchers. Indeed, 
Stevens and Kennan (2004) were not able to obtain appro-
priate data from the European Commission for a study they 
carried out on preferences for ACP countries, so the World 
Bank provided access to its data base. 
 
 
the Commission (2002).38 In fact, the ave-
rage utilisation rates for the region, at 55 
percent, stands at a very similar level as the 
average levels for all GSP beneficiaries. The 
utility rate is somewhat higher, reflecting 
perhaps a slightly more adequate targeting 
                                                          
38 The utilisation rate is the ratio of imports that enter the EU 
market under the GSP compared to total eligible imports 
from the country in question. The utility rate, on the other 
hand, is the ratio of preferential imports compared to total 
imports.  
 
   
of products by the EU in the granting of 
preferences to the region. However, what is 
particularly striking is the degree of varia-
bility regarding the up-take of the prefe-
rences on offer, with countries like Peru (93 
percent), Cuba (90 percent), Costa Rica (88 
percent) and Chile (84 percent) showing ex-
ceptionally high utilisation rates, whereas 
some of the poorest countries in the region, 
like the Dominican Republic (3 percent), 
Haiti (48 percent) or El Salvador (39 per 
cent) show much lower levels of utilisation. 
To some extent, therefore, the Commission’s 
own data contradicts the oft-made accusa-
tion that the Latin American countries do 
not make sufficient use of the existing pre-
ferences on offer. Some countries evidently 
do take good advantage of the system as it 
now stands.  
  
 
The European Commission, for its part, bla-
mes the lack of success of the GSP system on 
the weak supply-side response on the part of 
the Latin American countries themselves. 
They claim that most Latin American coun-
tries have been unable even to support re-
gional initiatives to increase trade among 
them, let alone enhance international com-
petitiveness relative to the rest of the world. 
Regional integration within Latin America is 
therefore considered by the European Com-
mission as a preliminary first step to enhan-
cing export competitiveness. In this sense, 
their reaction has been to promote the "bet-
ter use" of the GSP by supporting the diver-
sification of the export structure through the 
financing of activities designed to promote 
trade and increase knowledge of the Euro-
pean market (e.g. trade fairs, market studies, 
measures to support quality control). Al-
though these policies may be considered a 
step in the right direction, this kind of mea-
sure has not yet met with much success in 
altering the asymmetry of trading relations 
between the two regions.   
 
 
In comparative terms, Latin America enjoys 
a larger share of the GSP than Sub-Saharan 
Africa, as could be expected given the large 
difference in regional products. Never-
theless, the countries which have gained the 
most from the GSP are concentrated in Asia. 
Indeed, in 2001-2002, the GSP imports to 
the EU of three countries —China, India 
and Indonesia— represented over 50% of 
the world total. When this group is ex-
panded to consider the “top 10” GSP 
beneficiaries in trade (in dollar terms) –only 
Brazil and South Africa are non-Asian eco-
nomies– their share reaches close to four 
fifths of the total (see Graph 3). 
 
 
In sum, the idea that Latin America has be-
nefited considerably from the EU GSP is 
hard to sustain. Moreover, the empirical evi-
dence does not show that the special GSP 
regime for Andean and Central American 
countries (GSP+/GSP-Drugs) has resulted in 
significantly better access for their goods to 
the EU market39. Between 1997 and 2002 the 
value of total exports to the EU rose by 51% 
while GSP exports fell by 28%. It is true that 
over 7 billion euros worth of products en-
joyed zero tariffs, but it is also clear that the 
full potential has not been reached. Moreo-
ver, the data available tells us next to 
nothing about the impact on poverty of 
these GSP benefits.  
 
 
A recent evaluation of Colombia’s utilization 
of the EU GSP (Gonzalez, 2003) carried out 
by a private sector association –one of the 
few existing— concludes that the scheme 
overall has not contributed to increased Co-
lombian exports. The agricultural sector was 
the most benefited, but operators in that 
area have used the preferential scheme more 
as a “market stabilization mechanism than 
as a promoter of exports”. Industrial exports 
have fallen despite improved conditions in 
the GSP regulation. The most positive im-
pact of the GSP has been on diversifying 
Colombia’s export offer, but trade remains 
highly concentrated in few products. Despite 
its complete treatment of many aspects, this 
examination of the GSP barely deals with its 
socioeconomic impact. An exception to this 
is when it analyzes the possible graduation 
of the fishery sector, where it details the 
number of people employed and the fact 
that women heads of household would be 
the most affected. 
                                                          
39 However, the Secretariat for Central American Economic 
Integration (SIECA), in a study on the level of utilization of 
the GSP drugs scheme by countries in that sub-region 
(2002), noted it was low. For instance, they noted that the 
number of products which benefited from this regime ranged 
from 7 to 13 out of close to 1000 products included in the 
GSP. In a detailed analysis of GSP usage in the Andean sub-
region, a recent study (Nieto, 2002) concludes that the ad-
vantages of the GSP were not sufficient to stimulate trade 
between the EU and its Andean partners. In fact, these coun-
tries mostly exported non-dynamic products through the 
GSP. 
  
 
Graph 3 
Share of preferential imports in comparison (Average 2001-2002) 
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SOURCE: Prepared by authors on the basis of data provided by DG Trade, European Commission. 
Note: Top 10 recipients of GSP benefits in the world includes Brazil. 
 
 
What are the problems that have arisen? 
 
One of the main problems for beneficiary 
countries is precisely the frequency with 
which the EU revises the rules for GSP 
(every three years). This means that the 
whole system is effectively put on a “short 
leash”, increasing uncertainty about the 
permanence of the benefits on offer. Indeed, 
it is not clear that the new regulation will 
overcome this limitation because the July 
2004 guidelines (EC, 2004e) refer to the 
2006-2015 period, while the Commission’s 
October 2004 proposal (EC, 2004f) is 
limited to the three-year period beginning 
on July 1, 2005. 
 
A related problem is that the safeguard 
clause in the EU’s Generalised System of 
Preferences is restrictive and gives the EU a 
wide discretion in its use (McQueen, 1998). 
It refers to “cause or threaten to cause 
serious difficulties to a Community pro-
ducer of like or directly competing pro-
ducts” with the factors taken into consi-
deration including “low rate of capacity 
utilisation, falling stocks or production, low 
profitability, declining market share of EU 
producers”, with beneficiary countries being 
“informed” (i.e. not consulted) before the 
safeguard measures are put into effect.40  
                                                          
40 Council Regulation (EC) Nº 3881/94, Article 14. 
 
 
Even if in reality these measures are never 
put into practice, the mere existence of such 
safeguard clauses is often sufficient to 
dissuade investment in beneficiary sectors. 
 
In addition, as Brenton and Manchin 
(2003:757) stress, “the striking feature of 
the EU scheme is the low utilisation of these 
preferences”41. Data for 1999 reveal that only 
one third of EU imports from developing 
countries which were eligible for preferences 
actually entered the EU market with reduced 
duties. Why is this so? Increasingly, the fin-
ger is being pointed to the excessively strict 
rules of origin as one of the principal 
stumbling blocks.42 Rules of origin for small, 
undiversified developing countries are very 
damaging indeed, because they severely 
limit the extent to which they are able to 
take advantage of any preferential agreement 
– the weak domestic industry is usually 
highly dependent on imports for interme-
diate products, given the lack of sourcing 
possibilities within the country itself.43 This 
                                                          
41 A recent study by UNCTAD (2003) notes this is a common 
problem for all developing countries and for all preferential 
schemes. 
 
42 See, for instance, Brenton and Manchin (2003) and Mattoo, 
Roy and Subramaniam (2003). 
 
43 See Stevens and Kennan (2004a) for a discussion on Rules 
of Origin in the EU GSP. UNCTAD (2003) makes a strong 
criticism of these rules which is considers to be one of the 
   
is especially true for countries like Paraguay 
and Bolivia where primary products repre-
sent approximately 80 percent of total ex-
ports, and local value-added is generally 
very low. In practice, countries in this situa-
tion would have a hard time meeting EU 
requirements regarding rules of origin.  
 
 
In the mid-1990s, the particularly contro-
versial instrument of “graduation” was intro-
duced to the GSP, which implied that once 
certain sectors within a country reached a 
pre-determined level of exports or a pre-
determined level of per capita income, it 
would be “graduated” from the GSP scheme, 
and MFN tariffs would thereafter be applied. 
Graduation has already been applied to a 
number of sectors in Latin American coun-
tries like Argentina and Brazil. The most re-
cent countries to “suffer” graduation are 
Costa Rica and Colombia. The mechanism 
of graduation defeats the purpose of the 
GSP, because countries that manage to gain 
competitiveness in a particular sector are 
subsequently “punished” with the loss of the 
preference. In response to this criticism, the 
Commission’s October 2004 memorandum 
notes that “graduation is not a penalty; it is a 
sign that the GSP has successfully performed 
its functions” (EC, 2004f). This interpret-
tation is certainly subjective, but the Com-
mission also implicitly recognized the limi-
tations of this mechanism in previous regu-
lations by introducing significant changes in 
its new proposal. 
 
 
Another problem with the GSP is that it is 
mostly used by larger companies. As Stevens 
and Kennan (2004b: 5) note from the ACP 
experience, “in the main, successful, esta-
blished exporters are ‘able to work the sys-
tem’”. For Latin America, the data base is 
weak and analysis relies on impressions 
from the reports prepared by Latin American 
specialists for this study on the use of the 
GSP in Bolivia, Honduras and Paraguay44. 
One clear message from these reports is that 
information on the EU GSP is limited and 
mostly accessible to major corporations and 
                                                                                   
main reasons for under-utilization of existing preferences: 
“Some of the current features of rules of origin go against the 
very concept of trade facilitation” (p. xi). 
 
44 The evaluation of the Colombia GSP utilization (Gonzalez, 
2003) confirms this trend implicitly. 
 
/ or business associations representing their 
interests. In any case, it is interesting to note 
how little public debate there has been in 
these countries, when compared with other 
international trade matters. This reflects a 
lack of knowledge but also, perhaps, the 
perception that this preferential scheme is of 
little consequence. 
 
 
One of the worst problems with the GSP is 
not technical, but political. That is, the fact 
that it is available to almost everyone. In-
deed, Stevens and Kennan (2004b: 2) argue 
that benefits decline as same terms become 
available to all potential suppliers. The EU 
has yet to deal with this issue –called prefe-
rence erosion— in a systematic manner, 
although it has been cited in various policy 
documents as a problem to look into. 
 
 
Case Studies from Latin America45 
 
These problems are generally common to all 
developing countries, so it would be useful 
to review particular experiences in Latin 
America. For that purpose, two countries 
were selected for more in-depth analysis. 
The first case is Bolivia, one of the poorest 
countries in the region, a relatively impor-
tant aid recipient (with Official Develop-
ment Assistance/ODA representing close to 
10% of GDP), an economy still based on 
largely traditional commodity production 
and without direct access to the sea (which 
contributes to increased transport costs). 
Costa Rica, the second case, has a fairly high 
GDP per capita and one of the highest 
human development indices in the region. It 
does not receive much aid and its economy 
has gone through an extraordinary transfor-
mation resulting in a significant diversi-
fication of exports. Both countries have a 
small domestic market (with respective po-
pulation of 8 and 4 million) and both benefit 
from the GSP drugs regime. 
 
 
                                                          
45 Latin American specialists were asked to prepare brief 
reports on the EU GSP in their countries: Bolivia, Honduras 
and Paraguay. For this paper, we chose the Bolivian study 
because it had the most complete analysis and because it is 
one of the region’s poorest states. We wanted to contrast it 
with a case study of a more successful exporter, Costa Rica, 
for which we received considerable information from the 
Costa Rican embassy to the EU in Brussels –for which we are 
specially grateful—, which was complemented by other 
independent data. 
   
Case Study 1 – Bolivia 
 
With a per capita income of somewhat un-
der $1,000, Bolivia is the second poorest 
country in Latin America (after Haiti), with 
over a half of its population living on less 
than US$2 a day, and one of the highest in-
fant mortality rates in the world. In the last 
two years, the country has entered into a 
serious economic and political crisis. Bolivia 
has been a beneficiary of the European 
Union’s GSP-drugs trading regime since its 
instigation in November 1990, as part of EU 
policy against the drug trade.  
 
Ever since 1985 when a rigid structural 
adjustment programme was applied, Bolivia 
has maintained a relatively open trade regi-
me with very few restrictions on imports 
and with no subsidies on exports. As a result 
of its geographical location in the centre of 
South America, Bolivia acts as a sort of hinge 
between two customs unions: the Andean 
Community of Nations (Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela) and MERCOSUR 
(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay).   
 
 
 
Table 6 
Trade Balance of Bolvia with the EU, 1993-2002 (mlns US$) 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Exports to EU 270.6 290.3 305.2 271 312.4 307.8 285.4 249.7 136.9 94.3
- as % of total trade 38.1 29.1 29.3 23.9 26.7 27.8 27.2 20.0 10.7 7.2
Imports from EU 226.1 137.9 276.6 253.9 284.7 330 193 182.6 160.6 148.1
Trade Balance 44.5 152.4 28.6 17.1 27.7 -22.2 92.4 67.1 -23.7 -53.8
 
SOURCE: Pacheco (2003), from the National Statistics Institution (INE), Bolivia. 
 
 
 
The country’s commitment to free trade is 
therefore not in doubt. Yet its subsequent 
poor trade performance has been disap-
pointing, particularly with regards to the 
European Union (Table 6). Throughout the 
1990s, there was a marked decline of Boli-
vian exports to the EU. In 1993, 38.1% of all 
exported goods went to the EU, but by 1998 
that figure had fallen to 27.2 percent and in 
2002 the corresponding figure was only 7.2 
percent. Since 2001, Bolivia has actually 
been running a trade deficit with the EU. 
This is despite the fact that the vast majority 
of Bolivian exports fall under the GSP.  
 
 
As is clear in Graph 4, Bolivia’s utilisation of 
the GSP has varied considerably over the 
period 1997-2002, although on average it 
has been relatively high (60%). In terms of 
its effective utility –preferential exports/total 
exports to the EU— this instrument has not 
been that beneficial (average 7% per year) 
for Bolivia’s trade development. This reflects 
the fact that in absolute terms, Bolivia’s pre-
ferential exports to the EU have been falling 
steadily, from close to 24 million euros in 
1997 to slightly over 10 million euros in 
2001, with a slight recovery in 2002. 
 
 
What has happened? Firstly, overall sales to 
the EU have fallen by over 40% in this pe-
riod, reflecting dramatic declines in exports 
of several of Bolivia’s major products (see 
Graph 5), most notably in the jewellery (-
75%) and mineral products (-48%) sectors. 
Significant decreases were also evident in 
two other sectors: grains, seeds and fruits (-
92%) and coffees, teas and spices (-65%). 
Together, these four sectors accounted for a 
fall of 130 million euros between 1997 and 
2002.  
 
 
 
 
   
Graph 4 
Bolivia- EU-GSP imports, 1997-2002 
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SOURCE: Prepared by authors based on data provided by DG Trade, European Commission. 
 
 
 
All of these sectors benefited from the GSP 
drugs scheme except for mineral products 
(although the coffee and tea sector lost this 
status in 2001 as a result of “zeroing out” of 
this tariff). Only in three important sectors 
were there any positive trends during this 
period, but the total growth was only 17.8 
million euros. 
 
 
 
Graph 5 
GSP Statistics-Imports from Bolivia by sector, 1997-2002  (5 most important sectors) 
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SOURCE: Prepared by authors based on data provided by DG Trade, European Commission 
Notes: PI refers to Preferential Import; non-PI to non-preferential import. 
* Preferences were not available in 1999. 
** Preferences excepted in 1998 and 2002. 
 
  
Total Bolivian exports have been running at 
practically the same levels for 20 years now. 
Moreover, lack of diversification means that 
11 products constitute 80% of exports by 
value, with 76% of exports consisting of pri-
mary products. The most important export 
goods towards the EU market are minerals, 
which in 2002 represented 48.1 percent of 
the total. Since 1997, Brazil nuts have been 
exported on a significant scale. Other 
exports which contain a degree of value 
added, such as leather, textiles, wood 
products, jewellery and handicrafts, are not 
very significant.  
 
This unsatisfactory performance is despite 
the existence of several national program-
mes and institutions that try to stimulate 
Bolivian exports (such as RITEX and 
CEPROBOL).46 The European Union has 
been trying to support these institutions, 
and CEPROBOL has recently received a 1.2 
million grant from the EU, specifically with 
the aim of enhancing trade flows and 
investments between Bolivia and the EU. 
One area where help is clearly needed is to 
compensate for the lack of awareness of the 
importance of regulatory compliance, stan-
dardisation, and quality certification. In 
1999, Bolivia had only 4 ISO 9000 certified 
companies. It remains to be seen how 
effective this financial support will be to the 
CEPROBOL, although judging by past per-
formance of this kind of initiative, its impact 
both on export volumes and poverty 
reduction will probably be limited.  
 
Why has export performance been so poor, 
despite the clear commitment of the Bolivian 
political class to orthodox reform and ma-
croeconomic stabilization? From the mid-
1980s the Bolivian government liberalised 
its economy in line with the recom-
mendations of the World Bank and the IMF. 
Yet foreign capital never arrived in the 
expected quantities. The foreign investment 
that has taken place has generally focused 
on two sectors: hydrocarbons, encouraged 
by the discovery of gas reserves, and tele-
communications, following the opening of 
the market to competition at the end of 
2001. Unfortunately these investments, 
although significant in the national eco-
nomic context, do not generate much em-
ployment and have no major multiplier 
                                                          
46 Much of the following data comes from Inter-Service Task 
Force project documents for Bolivia (no date). 
effects. More importantly, the lack of trans-
parency in the way the government handled 
international energy contracts and planned 
projects in this area, provoked massive and 
violent demonstrations which lead to Pre-
sident Sánchez de Losada’s fleeing Bolivia in 
the fall of 2003. The new government, 
heavily pressured by social actors, has 
tended to favour a nationalist focus, con-
tributing to a significant reductions in 
foreign investments. 
 
On the other hand, investments in manu-
facturing industry and agri-business repre-
sent only 11% of total foreign investment. In 
sum, foreign investment has contributed lit-
tle or nothing to the diversification of the 
Bolivian economy. If anything, it has helped 
consolidate the dominance of the primary 
sector in the export structure of the 
economy.   
 
Despite an unfavourable international con-
text, over the decade of the 1990s total 
export volumes increased by 57 percent. 
Some sectors showed marked dynamism. 
Agricultural exports, for instance, increased 
at a rate of 10.3 percent, compared to a 
world average of 3.1 percent (Loza, 2002: 
185). But in a good example of the phe-
nomenon of “running to stand still”, the 
terms of trade have shifted sharply against 
Bolivian exports over the last twenty years. 
In an extensive analysis of the factors affect-
ting Bolivian’s terms of trade, Loza (2002) 
observes that even the growth of non-
traditional exports, such as Brazil nuts or 
soya, has not diminished Bolivia’s vulne-
rability to volatile and declining terms of 
trade. The only policy likely to succeed in 
reducing risk, he concludes, is the develop-
ment of manufacturing exports. 
 
Another important element which goes a 
long way to explaining the apparently poor 
export performance is that Bolivian frontiers 
can be considered as a leaky sieve –in 1990, 
the Bolivian government lost about $109 
million per year in revenue through contra-
band–. By 1997, the estimated annual 
amount lost had risen to about $430 million 
(Kaufmann, Mastruzzi and Zavaleta, 
2002:16).  
 
One way forward could be to follow the 
example of the German GTZ in its extensive 
and long-term involvement in the formation 
of a successful federation of cocoa producers 
   
at El Ceibo. The producers of El Ceibo 
found their market niche in fair trade 
chocolate and cocoa, and were helped by the 
GTZ which provided marketing and tech-
nical help as well as funding. A high degree 
of co-operation was achieved because the 
project built on a tradition in Bolivia of 
community organisations which, following 
the Revolution of 1953, were created ‘to act 
as a bridge between local people and go-
vernment and other external institutions” 
(Bebbington, 1996).  Even so, it is not clear 
whether this would serve as a model for the 
broader economy. 
 
However, in the case of such a fragmented, 
racially-divided, community as that in Boli-
via, it seems difficult to conceive that trade 
initiatives are the best policy tool if poverty 
reduction is the priority, although for this 
aid to be effective, significant efforts would 
be needed to buttress local institutional 
capacity. More direct aid to the most depri-
ved (principally indigenous) communities is 
required. Despite increased budget alloca-
tions for education, and some improvement 
in enrolment rates, by the early nineties well 
over one-half the adult population were 
functionally illiterate. Basic health services 
are also woefully inadequate. Infant, child 
and maternal mortality rates are among the 
highest in Latin America, while vaccination 
rates for children have remained stagnant or 
even worsened since the late 1980s 
(Kaufmann, Mastruzzi and Zavaleta, 
2002:18). Well-targeted aid complementing 
market preferences seems to be the way 
forward for Bolivia.  
 
 
Case Study 2: Costa Rica  
 
This case study illustrates one of the 
principal paradoxes of the current GSP 
system as applied by the EU: through the 
system of graduation, the GSP punishes 
countries which achieve high rates of export 
growth in sectors where preferences are 
made available. Although its GDP per capita 
is close to the average level for Latin Ame-
rica, in terms of human development, Costa 
Rica is often considered a success story. On 
examining indicators like life expectancy, 
infant mortality or literacy, Costa Rica has 
attained objectives far above the levels 
which correspond to its income per capita, 
standing as it does in the 41 place of the 
UNDP’s HDI. As a consequence, the country 
is no longer a priority for donor countries, 
and has been gradually losing aid. For this 
reason, Costa Rica has become increasingly 
dependent on exports as a way of generating 
foreign exchange (see Figure 7).  
 
 
 
Figure 7 
Costa Rican Exports of Goods and Services and Aid Receipts, 1985-2002 
 
SOURCE: World Bank WDI online. 
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In many respects, Costa Rica has managed 
this transformation well, and can be consi-
dered a success in the promotion of exports. 
For instance, between 1985 and 2000 Costa 
Rica’s exports to the United States, its 
principal export market, grew five-fold, from 
$1.1 billion to $5.5 billion. Along with this 
high rate of export growth, there has been a 
marked decrease in the dependence on 
primary products, and a sharp increase in 
high-technology exports, from practically 
negligible levels in 1985 to over 35% for 
exports to the United States (UNCTAD, 
2002). This has principally been due to the 
success of Costa Rica’s foreign investment 
promotion agency, CINDE, in attracting 
export-oriented FDI, including a micro-chip 
plant owned by Intel which alone was 
responsible for $1.676 billion of exports in 
2000. In agriculture, too, there has been a 
significant diversification away from the 
traditional export crops towards products 
such as cut-flowers and plants. The principal 
incentive behind this process of diver-
sification has not been the shift towards a 
more liberal trade regime, but rather the 
difficult international context for Costa 
Rica’s main export crops: the rapid emer-
gence of Vietnam on international markets 
as a coffee and rice producer, and problems 
of access to European markets. This has 
obliged many Costa Rican producers to 
switch away from traditional crops.  
 
A result of these structural changes and 
despite popular perceptions to the contrary, 
is that Costa Rica is no longer a predo-
minantly agricultural economy. According 
to data from the Costa Rican Household 
Survey, only 15.6 percent of the econo-
mically active population now work in the 
agricultural sector. However, more than a 
third (37.7%) of the people that fall under 
the national poverty line are still employed 
in the agricultural sector, a fact which 
denotes the importance of rural areas in any 
strategy to reduce poverty (Estado de la 
Nación, 2002: 177).  
 
Despite Costa Rica’s undoubted successes in 
human development, it would be wrong to 
give the impression that the country has 
resolved the significant social problems 
related to poverty. Indeed, the Achilles’ heal 
of the Costa Rican “model” of social deve-
lopment is that it has been unable to make 
much progress in eliminating poverty. The 
country has suffered what is seemingly a 
structural level of poverty which rarely has 
fallen below 20 per cent of the population 
on the basis of the national poverty line. 
Poverty is especially serious in rural areas, 
where one in four families falls under the 
poverty line.  
 
Moreover, the international context for 
Costa Rica has not been favourable in recent 
years. Since the year 2000, it has suffered its 
lowest growth rate in the last twenty years. 
Total exports have fallen by 22 percent from 
the year 1999 to 2001, and exports to the 
EU have fallen from $1.4 billion to $0.8 
billion. The country is confronting an extre-
mely adverse external market for its four 
principal export products –coffee, bananas, 
electronic chips and tourism– and the terms 
of trade for products like coffee are currently 
at historic lows. The situation in the coffee 
market is particularly worrying from the 
point of view of the poverty reduction –over 
90 percent of the coffee producers are 
categorised as “small holders”– (Estado de la 
Nación, 2002:180). 
 
Within this broad and difficult context, and 
contrary to the criticisms of the European 
Commission that Latin American countries 
have not been taking sufficient advantage of 
the market preferences made available, Cos-
ta Rica has managed a high rate of utilisation 
under the GSP+ --81.2% in 2001--47. It is 
thus doubly unfortunate that an important 
sector for Costa Rica has recently been re-
moved from the GSP system under the 
aforementioned graduation mechanism. Iro-
nically, the balance of trade of Costa Rica 
with the EU had already shown symptoms of 
deterioration prior to this move. Moreover, 
the sector affected by graduation, Sector V 
(“Live plants, vegetables and fruits”) inclu-
des many products which are produced 
principally by small holders, and employs 
migrants, women and poor workers. The 
removal of the GSP+ benefits will imply an 8 
percent tariff in future, in a sector where 
there is considerable competition from 
                                                          
47 It is true that a decrease of preferential exports can be 
detected for all sectors (except textile and industrial 
products) but this decrease is due to a decline in eligible 
trade due to the zeroing of the MFN duty of 198 tariff lines 
(including coffee).  
   
neighbouring countries such as Guatemala 
and Colombia.  
 
The Costa Rican government believes that 
the Commission’s decision to graduate the 
sector is unfair, on a number of grounds: 
 
Ÿ First, graduation has occurred because 
just one of the products in the sector, 
(pineapples) has exceeded the 25% limit 
of total EU-imports. Yet the EU’s own 
regulations do not make it clear whether 
graduation occurs when just one pro-duct 
in the sector surpasses the pre-established 
limit, or whether all the products in the 
sector have to exceed the said limit. 
Moreover, most pineapple production is in 
the hands of a major US-owned exporter, 
while the rest of Sector V is characterised 
by small-scale producers who will suffer 
the consequences of graduation. This 
clearly goes against the spirit of the GSP+ 
as an instrument for poverty reduction. 
The Costa Ricans argue that some kind of 
flexibility in the application of the rules 
should be possible in these cases.  
 
Ÿ There are a number of technical dis-
crepancies about the application of gra-
duation. For instance, graduation has been 
applied on the basis of trade data for the 
years 1997-99, not the most recent data, 
which, given the deteriorating trade 
balance between Costa Rica and the EU in 
the intervening period, the Costa Ricans 
consider as unfair. In addition, in an 
example of the unilateral way in which the 
preference regime is managed, the Com-
mission insists on using EUROSTAT data 
for the purposes of evaluating “gradua-
tion”, and has refused to acknowledge the 
validity of Costa Rican statistics on 
exports.  
 
Ÿ When the graduation system was first 
introduced in the mid-1990s, the Com-
mission let it be known that “graduation” 
would only be applied gradually, in the 
sense that the higher standard GSP tariffs 
would only be slowly phased in, in order 
to minimise the negative effects of gradua-
tion for producers. In the intervening 
period, however, this has been overlooked, 
and graduation will, according to recent 
declarations, be applied immediately. 
 
Ÿ Over the last four years the European 
share of Costa Rican exports has fallen 
from 21.3 percent to 16.4 percent, 
compared to the 60 percent of exports des-
tined to the US. One of the objectives of 
the GSP+ has been to counteract these 
tendencies of the progressive margina-
lisation of EU trade with the region. 
Sudden graduation will only contribute to 
enhancing these trends.  
 
Ÿ Finally, according to the Costa Ricans, 
the political dimension of the GSP+ seems 
to have been forgotten. The scheme was 
extended to the Central American coun-
tries to help the region reach its deve-
lopmental goals, negatively affected as it 
has been by the drugs trade, severe 
flooding and a very difficult international 
environment.   
 
 
Lessons from case studies 
 
There are some emerging lessons from this 
case study analysis. A first lesson is that the 
GSP is used more than is apparent. Howe-
ver, at the same time, the GSP, as it is now 
applied is of most benefit to those who least 
need it. Globally, trade dynamos such as 
China concentrate close to a third of the 
benefits on offer through the EU’s prefe-
rential scheme, while Bolivia’s share of the 
benefits –a country with greater obstacles to 
world economic integration— is minuscule. 
Is the GSP supposed to reward global traders 
or countries that are struggling to compete 
in the international market? This issue 
should be at the heart of current efforts to 
reform this policy tool. 
 
Nevertheless, the Bolivian case also shows 
that it is better not to expect too much from 
tariff preference regimes. If a country has 
critical internal political, social and econo-
mic problems, there is little the GSP or any 
similar trade instrument can do to foster 
growth, development or poverty reduction. 
In other words, the GSP may only work if 
the conditions are right, but determining 
what these are is not easy. 
 
At the same time, is it right to take away 
GSP benefits from a poverty-prone sector 
because a country has been successful in 
developing it? This seems to be what hap-
pened in Costa Rica. The rigid application of 
current criteria leads to results which are 
inconsistent with the poverty objective of 
EU development policy. How can the GSP 
   
regime be designed and/or implemented so 
it can take account of these concerns? 
 
Finally, the differences between the expe-
rience in Bolivia and Costa Rica make it 
clear that the GSP’s effects may vary consi-
derably depending on local conditions. But, 
as the GSP is applied –theoretically at least– 
in the same way to all developing countries, 
it is difficult to take account of these 
variations.  
 
 
Conclusions and Policy 
Recommendations 
 
The purpose of this policy paper is to 
analyse and propose ideas about how the 
European Union could have a greater impact 
on reducing poverty through its trade 
policy, in conjunction with other policy ins-
truments. For that goal, and regardless of 
what the new Generalised System of Prefe-
rence scheme set to come out in 2005 looks 
like, it is useful now to analyse the poverty 
effects of EU preferential schemes. An ove-
rall premise of this study is that this ins-
trument has had at best a limited impact on 
the lives of the poor –particularly in rural 
areas— in Latin America. 
 
The partial and incomplete information avai-
lable suggests this premise is correct. In-
deed, the empirical evidence reveals cases in 
which the potential of the GSP to benefit the 
poor and excluded is demonstrated. Unfor-
tunately, we know little about why this trade 
policy tool seems to serve the poverty goal 
sometimes, while in other circumstances it 
does not. 
 
This reflects a major problem surrounding 
the preferential regime: the lack of informa-
tion about how it has functioned and what 
are its main results let alone what impact it 
may have48. This is partly due to the unila-
teral nature of the instrument which results 
in the EU not being accountable to the 
                                                          
48 In fact, in the process of preparing this policy paper, the 
researchers faced this limitation constantly. One of their first 
discoveries was that information about the GSP is not readily 
available. This is not just a problem for researchers, but is 
also faced by the beneficiary countries themselves. For 
instance, when the SIECA (2002) carried out a study on the 
use of the GSP in Central America, it could not even get 
access to Community data, so it had to rely on information 
from each of its member states (which may contradict that 
which the EU has). 
beneficiary countries nor even to its own 
citizens. This is contradictory given the 
Community’s numerous statements about 
the importance of the principles of partner-
ship and ownership in the development 
policy process. In that sense, the GSP is an 
anomaly, but this does not mean that it 
should be eliminated, rather that it needs 
some significant changes that go beyond 
technical “tinkering”. In some ways the new 
scheme may be addressing this problem, but 
as occurred with earlier versions, it is 
entirely the result of internal bureaucratic 
decision-making, with absolutely no consul-
tation of the key stakeholders. 
 
Nevertheless, even if it were possible to 
overcome the informational problem, it is 
necessary to do more than just facilitate data 
regarding the overall results of the prefe-
rential regime. Available data does not allow 
for detecting a clear link between the GSP 
and poverty reduction. Presently, it is only 
possible to tell whether benefits are concen-
trated more on the better off or on poorer 
countries, and if the sectors which are bene-
fited are those most likely to positively affect 
the lives of the poor and excluded groups. 
Only with deeper micro-level analysis 
(which goes beyond the mandate for this 
paper) would it be possible to determine this 
with a minimum of rigour. For that purpose 
it should be recalled that there has never 
been an evaluation carried out on this 
instrument and made publicly available. 
 
In the meantime, the global and regional 
trade system is changing rapidly. In this 
context, shifts in the preferential access 
agreements by themselves are unlikely to 
bear much fruit. The main process to watch 
is the WTO Doha Round. Although this 
seems stuck for the time being, it includes 
key issues of relevance to special and diffe-
ring treatment of developing countries. The 
ongoing negotiations to create a Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) are an out-
growth of NAFTA and, if successful, will 
radically change the panorama in Latin 
America. As free trade agreements prolife-
rate in the region, the GSP system will su-
rely become less relevant. Some authors, 
such as Giordano (2003) and Salafranca 
(2001) propose Association Agreements for 
all Latin American countries with the EU to 
compensate for this situation. The EU is 
gradually moving in this direction, with 
agreements already signed with Chile and 
   
Mexico and ongoing negotiations with Mer-
cosur (although these once again failed to 
advance in the October 2004 rounds). The 
market access that these countries gain 
would certainly be beneficial.  
 
 
However, according to the Community, the 
Andean and Central American countries are 
not currently in a condition to assume a free 
trade agreement with the EU. Thus, for 
these countries the GSP will remain the only 
alternative for the coming years. Yet, the 
tool has proved to be a blunt one, even in 
narrow terms of promoting exports; as one 
commentator puts it, zones like Central 
America are caught between entering into an 
asymmetrical but eventually reciprocal trade 
agreement with Europe and a preferential 
system with constantly eroding benefits 
(Jessop, 2004). 
 
 
The lack of success of the GSP in contri-
buting to poverty reduction in the Latin 
American countries can be attributed to 
various reasons. As pointed out in the last 
section, some of these reasons are due to 
domestic social and economic conditions, 
about which the European Union’s ability to 
influence change is limited. But other factors 
which explain the poor performance of the 
GSP and enhanced GSP as a poverty re-
duction tool are clearly related to the way in 
which the preferences have been designed 
and implemented. Chief among these weak-
nesses are the lack of permanence in these 
preferences; poor knowledge of the Euro-
pean market; a failure to provide sufficient 
help to strengthen indigenous technological 
capacity and facilitate access for small-scale 
producers; and excessively strict rules of 
origin. A number of measures could be 
implemented to make the benefits more 
durable:  
 
 
• In the first place, the graduation system 
needs to be thoroughly revised, both 
conceptually and with regards to its 
implementation. Although there may be 
a justification for some kind of system of 
graduation to avoid the lion’s share of 
the benefits of GSP being taken by a few 
more dynamic exporters, in its current 
form the system often functions contrary 
to the objective of maximising poverty 
reduction. For instance, if the system of 
graduation is to be retained, it would be 
better to impose a system based on 
product data, rather than sector data. If 
the objective is truly poverty reduction, 
then the Costa Rican complaint on this 
point seems well-founded –it is unfair to 
graduate an entire sector on the basis of 
the activities of a few multinational cor-
porations. The proposed new scheme 
seems to address these concerns by 
reducing negative effects for smaller and 
poorer countries that may have one or 
two dynamic exports to the EU. 
 
 
• Secondly, the GSP scheme could be con-
solidated on a more permanent basis, 
without the revisions to which it is 
currently subject. The enhanced GSP re-
gime has been changed no less than 
three times since its creation, in 1994, 
1998, and again at the end of 2001, and 
another revision is due at the end of 
2004. This situation obviously under-
mines any positive incentives to invest-
ment in preference-receiving sectors. If 
benefits were extended on a, say, fifteen 
year basis, the EU would give a clear 
signal regarding the seriousness of its 
intentions to help Latin American coun-
tries strengthen their exporting capaci-
ties. In this regard, it is disappointing to 
note that the Commission’s October 
2004 memorandum returns to the idea 
of a three-year scheme, whereas the July 
2004 guidelines mentioned a 10-year 
period. 
 
 
• In the same sense, safeguard clauses 
need to be redrawn, to reduce the degree 
of discretion in their application. Sig-
nificant investment into export-oriented 
sectors in these countries is unlikely in 
the context of uncertainty produced by 
the highly discretionary way in which 
the policy is implemented.   
 
 
• Poor knowledge of the European market 
has traditionally been tackled by trade-
fairs, market studies, and support to 
comply with technical standards, etc., 
and in this area more support could be 
given to lower income Latin American 
countries. There are a number of initia-
   
tives in this sense in countries like Bo-
livia, but currently they are under-
funded and not well-integrated with the 
overall development policy. More finan-
cial resources would help, but as im-
portant are efforts to mainstream trade 
concerns in the aid management and 
improve understanding about develop-
ment cooperation in DG Trade. In sum, 
for the GSP to contribute to poverty re-
duction, deeper coordination is requi-
red; the Inter-Service Task Force on Tra-
de and Development is a good step in 
this direction, but its efforts should be 
broadened. In addition, the Commission 
ought to work more closely with the 
member states in this area. At present 
inter-institutional communications on 
the subject are not systematised. 
 
 
• With regards to the point on excessively 
strict rules of origin, there is a notable 
lack of transparency in the making of 
these rules. This might suggest that EU 
policy is prisoner to special interests and 
business lobbies. But Brenton and 
Manchin (2003) argue that this may not 
even be the case -that the rules of origin 
do not obey any political or even eco-
nomic logic and are imposed simply 
because of precedent. Revision of these 
rules may therefore be easier than one 
might initially anticipate, although as 
Stevens and Kennan (2004: 4) correctly 
note, “it will always be very difficult to 
set the rules so that they are ‘just right’”; 
for that reason, they suggest “prefe-
rence-givers should always err on the 
side of cautious liberality”. On this 
point, the Commission has advanced in 
its recent proposal in the sense of 
making these rules more flexible and 
encouraging regional accumulation. 
 
 
• Finally, more research is required into 
the links between export promotion and 
poverty reduction if programmes like 
the enhanced GSP are to be justified. In-
depth studies along the lines of the one 
produced by the Costa Rican govern-
ment regarding the link between export 
growth and poverty impact need to be 
carried out. The EU could even provide 
support for these efforts as a way of 
increasing local ownership.  
In the final resort, of course, the issue of 
what to do with the GSP is a political one. It 
might be considered that the political advan-
tages of maintaining the current GSP system 
as it stands outweigh the costs. If so, a refor-
mist agenda should be considered, encom-
passing some of the points that have been 
raised here and elsewhere.  
 
 
This paper ultimately calls for a more po-
verty-focused GSP, that is, a scheme that 
includes proactive measures aimed at redu-
cing poverty (which does not just mean that 
it should be more focused on poorer coun-
tries). This might involve not only imple-
menting some or all of the suggested chan-
ges, but also finding ways to integrate the 
preferential scheme more closely with deve-
lopment cooperation programmes. As one 
Inter-American Development Bank study 
noted recently, “there is no doubt that a 
trade and cooperation nexus is a desirable 
objective in initiatives designed to deepen 
North-South relationships” (Devlin, et al, 
2002: 112). Against a backdrop of rising 
poverty, social and political tensions in Latin 
America, it seems clear that the EU needs to 
improve both the quantity and quality of the 
aid provided to the region.  
 
 
Trade promotion is no substitute for good 
quality aid which can have a much more 
direct impact on the poor. However, the real 
challenge is to make aid and trade work 
together against poverty49, with the Genera-
lised System of Preferences as a key compo-
nent of EU policy; the Commission admits 
as much in its recent policy statements (EC 
2004e/f). Development cooperation by itself 
will never be sufficient to foster the rates of 
growth and broader development that result 
in a significant reduction in poverty and ine-
quality. In this sense, the GSP (with or 
without the special arrangements) could be 
used to demonstrate the EU’s pro-poor 
orientation to Latin America, provided 
changes are introduced and only if it is well-
integrated with other development policy 
instruments. 
                                                          
49 This is one of the many conclusions of a High-Level Round 
Table on Trade and Poverty held at UNCTAD XI, Sao Paolo, 
Brazil, in June 2004: “International trade is an essential 
component of the comprehensive set of global reforms that 
are required. Nevertheless, there should be no substitution of 
aid for trade. Rather, the question is how to make trade and 
aid mutually support each other, and how to use aid more 
effectively for trade” (UNCTAD, 2004c). 
   
In sum, this text does not propose a simple 
solution to what is a complex issue. That 
would not be viable or helpful to policy-
makers wrestling with many complexities 
(although they would prefer easy answers). 
In the end, our main contribution may be 
more modest: to put this matter on the 
public agenda, contributing to a broader 
discussion that, in the end, ought to lead to 
improved policy.  
   
References 
 
 
ADE (2004). “Evaluation of Trade-Related Assistance by the European Commission in Third Countries”. 
Final Report, Vol. 1 (May). Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium (www.ade.be). 
 
Apea, Y. (2004). “Recent WTO Dispute Settlement Cases: Some Considerations for the ACP”, Trade 
Negotiations Insights, Vol. 3, No 5 (September), pp. 4-5 
 
Banniester, Geoffrey J. and Kamau Thugge (2001), "International Trade and Poverty Alleviation", IMF Wor-
king Paper WP/01/54 
 
Bebbington, A. (1996). "Organizations and Intensifications: Campesino Federations, Rural Livelihoods and 
Agricultural Technology in the Andes and Amazonia." World Development 24(7): 1161-1177. 
 
Berry, A. (1997). “The Income Distribution Threat in Latin America”, Latin American Research Review, Vol, 
32, Nº2, pp. 3-40. 
 
Bhagwati, Jagdish (2002), “The poor’s best hope”, The Economist, 20th June 2002, electronic edition.  
 
Bora, B., Cernat, L., and A. Turrini (2002). “Duty and Quota-Free Access for LDCs: Further Evidence from 
CGE Modelling, UNCTAD Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study Series Nº 14. 
 
Brenton, Paul and Miriam Manchin (2003), Making EU Trade Agreements Work: The Role of Rules of 
Origin", The World Economy, Volume 26 Issue 5, May, pp.755-769 
 
Buitelaar, R. and R. Perez (2000), “Maquila, economic reofrm and corporate strategies”, World Deve-
lopment, 28 (9), pp.1627-42 
 
Bulmer Thomas, Victor (1998), “La Historia Económica de América Latina desde la Independencia”, Fondo 
de Cultura Económica, México 
 
Carter, Michael R. and Bradford L. Barham (1996), Level Playing Fields and Laissez Faire: Postliberal 
Development Strategy in Ineqalitarian Agrarian Economies", World Development, Vol. 24, Nº 7, pp.1133-
1149 
 
Cline, W. (2003). Trade Policy and Global Poverty. Washington, DC, Institute of International Economics. 
 
Consejo Andino de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores (2004). “Comunicación al Alto Representante de la 
Unión Europea sobre la Vigencia del Sistema Generalizado de Preferencias para la Lucha contra las drogas.” 
New York, 22 September. 
 
Cornia, Giovanni Andrea, and Julius Court (2001), Inequality, Growth and Poverty in the Era of 
Liberalization and Globalization", UNU/WIDER, Geneva. 
 
Cortés, F., Hernandez, D., Hernández, E., Székely, M. and  H. Vera, 2002, “Evolución y caracterísicas de la 
Pobreza en México en la Última Década del Siglo XX”, SEDESOL, Serie: documentos de investigación, 
México, agosto. 
 
Deere, Carmen Diana and Magdalena Leon (2003), “The Gender Asset Gap: Land in Latin America”, World 
Development Vol 31. Nº 6, pp.925-947. 
 
Devlin, R., Estevadeordal, A. and E. Krivonos (2002). “The trade and Cooperation Nexus: How does the 
Mercosur-EU Process Measure Up?” in P. Giordano, ed., An Integrated Approach to the European Union-
Mercosur Association. (Paris, Chaire Mercosur de Science Po), pp. 79-117. 
 
Dolan, C. J. Humprey and C. Harris-Pascal (1999), ‘Horticultural Commodity Chains: The impact of the UK 
Market on the African Fresh Vegetable Industry”, Working Paper 96, IDS.  
 
Dunkley, Graham (2004). Free Trade – Myth, Reality and Alternatives, Zed Books, London 
 
DG Trade (2003), Press release: “Trade preferences: Commission proposes to roll over current EU regime for 
developing countries”, Brussels, 29 October 2003. 
   
EC-European Comisión (2000), Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the European Community’s Development Policy. Brussels (COM (2000) 212). 
----  (2002) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Trade and 
Development. Assisting Developing Countries to benefit from Trade. Brussels (COM (2002) 513). 
---- (2003a) Council Regulation 815/2003 (8 May 2003). 
---- (2003b), “Communication from the Commission to the Council, to the European Parliament and to the 
Economic and Social Commitee: Reviving the DDA Negotiations – The EU Perspective”. Brussels, 26 
November 2003. 
---- (2003c), "The EU's Relations with the Andean Community" on EU web site 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/andean/intro/index.htm#gsp). 
----- (2003d), “Guidelines for European Commission Trade Related Assistance” Inter Service Task Force on 
Trade and Development May 2003, Version 1.0. 
---- (2004a). La Unión Europea, América Latina y el Caribe. Una Asociación Estratégica. Brussels, May 2004. 
----- (2004b). Doha Development Agenda. Making Trade work for All. Brussels, 2004. 
Estado de la Nación (2002), Estado de la Nacion en Desarrollo Humano Sostenible, Pavas, Costa Rica  
----- (2004c). The European Union’s Generalised System of Preferentes. Brussels, DG Trade, February. 
----- (2004d). “Communication from the Commission the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The Social Dimension of Globalization- 
The EU’s policy contribution on extending the benefits to all”. Brussels, May 2004. 
----- (2004e). “Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the 
European Economic and Social Committee: Developing Countries, international trade and sustainable 
development: the function of the Community’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for the ten-year 
period from 2006 to 2015”. Brussels, Com (2004) 461 final. 
----- (2004f). “Developing countries: facts and figures on the new EU scheme of trade preferences for 2006-
2008.” Brussels, 20 October (memorandum:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/gsp/memo201004_en.htm). 
 
Ferranti, D., Perry, G., Ferreiro, F. and M. Walton (2003). Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with 
History? Washington, DC, World Bank.  
 
Ganuza, E., Morley, S., Robinson, S., Pineiro, V. and R. Vos (2004). “¿Son buenas la promoción de expor-
taciones y la liberalización para los pobres en América Latina y el Caribe. Un Análisis micro-macro basado en 
modelos computables de equilibrio general,” in E. Ganuza et al, Eds, ¿Quién se beneficia del libre comercio? 
Promoción de exportaciones en América Latina y el Caribe en los 90. Bogotá, Alfa-Omega Publishers 
(www.undp.org/rblac/finaldrafts). 
 
Gilsen, I. and S. Grimm (2004). “EU trade partnerships with developing countries,” European Development 
Cooperation to 2010, EDC Briefing (April). 
 
Giordano, P. (2003), “Las Relaciones Unión Europea-América Latina en el Marco del Sistema Comercial 
Multilateral”, Información Comercial Española. April, Nº 806, pp.9-21 
 
Gonzalez, J. (2003). Colombia dentro del Sistema Generalizado de Preferencias de la Unión Europea, Bogotá, 
ANDI (www.andi.com.co). 
 
Grilli, E. (1993), The European Union and the Developing Countries, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
 
Hernández, A. (2003). “Honduras y el SPG de la UE” briefing paper prepared for the project (mimeo). 
 
Holland, M. (2002), The European Union and the Third World, Palgrave, New York. 
 
ICSTD (2004a). “EU GSP Scheme under debate and review”, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol 8, nº 2, 
21 January 2004 (www.ictsd.org/weekly/). 
------ (2004b). “WTO Appelate Body: Differentiation possible under Preference Schemes”, Bridges Weekly 
Trade News Digest, Vol 8, nº 14, 22 April 2004 (www.ictsd.org/weekly/). 
 
Inter-American Development Bank/IADB (2004). III EU-LAC Summit: Special Issue on Latin American and 
Caribbean Economic Relations with the European Union. Washington, DC, Integration, Trade and 
Hemispheric Issues Division Periodic Note May 2004. 
 
Jessop, D. (2004). “This week in Europe” (October 25). Brussels, Caribean Council. 
 
   
Kaufman, D., M. Mastruzzi and D. Zavaleta, “Sustained Macroeconomic Reforms, Tepid Growth: A 
Governance Puzzle in Bolivia”, paper presented at the Harvard CID/KSG Analytical Growth Narrative 
Conference (Draft).  
 
Lister, Marjorie (1997), The European Union and the South, Routledge, London. 
 
Loza T., Gabriel (2002), “El shock de precios de los productos básicos en Bolivia”, La Revista de la CEPAL, 
76, April, pp.179-197 
 
Lustig, Nora (2001), “Life is not Easy: Mexico´s Quest for Stability and Growth”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Volume 15, Number 1, Winter, pp.86-106 
 
Mattoo, Aaditya, Devesh Roy and Arvind Subramanian (2003), "The African Growth and Opportunity Act 
and its Rules of Origin: Generosity Undermined?" The World Economy, Volume 26, Issue 6, June, pp.829-
851. 
 
McKay Andrew, L.Alan Winters and Abbi Mamo Kedir (2000), "A Review of Empirical Evidence on Trade, 
Trade Policy and Poverty", June, background document for the Second Development White Paper (DFID).  
 
Medina-Smith, E. (2001). “Is the Export-led Hypothesis Valid for developing countries? A Case study of 
Costa Rica”, UNCTAD Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study Series Nº 7. 
 
Mold, A. (2003) “European Union trade policy and the poor. Towards improving the poverty impact of the 
GSP in Latin America”, Background paper for project. Madrid (mimeo). 
 
Mold, A. and C. Rozo (2004- forthcoming), “Liberalization, growth and welfare. The ‘maquiliación’of the 
Mexican Economy”, in K. Sharma and O. Morrissey, Eds., Growth and Poverty in Developing Countries. 
London, Routledge. 
 
Nieto Solís, José Antonio (2002), "Exportación Andina Hacia la UE: Indices de Especialización Comercial y 
Cuotas de Mercado", ICES-Información Comercial Española, October, Nº 802, pp.173-194. 
 
Official Journal of the European Communities (2002) “Notice published pursuant to Article 12(4) of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2501/2001 of 10 December 2001 applying a scheme of generalised tariff 
preferences for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004”, published on 25 September 2002. 
 
Pacheco, N. (2003). “El Sistema Generalizado de Preferencias de la Unión Europea y Bolivia”, briefing paper 
for this Project (mimeo). 
 
Palma, G. (2003), “The Latin American Economies During the Second Half of the Twentieth Century – from 
the Age of ‘ISI’ to the Age of ‘The End of History’”, in Ha-Joon Chang (editor), “Rethinking Development 
Economics”, Anthem Press, London 
 
Rodríguez, R. (2003). “Paraguay: Comercio, Pobreza y Preferencias Arancelarias no recíprocas de la UE”, 
briefing paper for this Project (mimeo). 
 
Salafranca, Ignacio (2001). Report on a global partnership and a common strategy for relations between the 
European Union and Latin America. Towards comprehensive association and a common strategy for 
relations between the European Union and Latin America. Brussels, European Parliament, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy (Report A5-0336/2001). 
 
Sender, John (2003), “Rural Poverty and Gender: Analytical Frameworks and Policy Proposals”, in Ha-Joon 
Chang (ed.), “Rethinking Development Economics”, Anthem Press, London. 
 
SIECA-Secretaria de Integración Económica centroamericana (2002), “Grado de aprovechamiento del 
Sistema generalizado de Preferencias Arancelarias SGP)”, Centroamérica, October 2002. 
 
Stallings, B. and W. Peres, (2000), “Growth, Employment and Equity: The Impact of the Economic Reforms 
in Latin America and the Caribbean”, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press and the United Nations 
Economic Comisión for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 
Stevens, C. and J. Kennan (2004a): “Making trade preferences more effective”, Sussex, Institute for Deve-
lopment Studies. 
   
----- (2004b): “The utilization of EU preferences to the ACP”, paper presented to technical seminar on Tarriff 
Preferences and their Utilisation, WTO, Geneva, 31 March 2004 (mimeo). 
 
The Economist, (2002), "Weighing up the WTO", November 21st.  
 
Tornell, A., Westermann, F. and L. Martinez (2004). “NAFTA and Mexico’s Less-than-stellar performance”, 
NBER Working Paper 10289, February. 
 
Transnational Institute (2002) “Alternative Development and Eradication: The Failed Balance in the Andean 
Region”, Drugs & Conflict Debate Paper No 4, March (Amsterdam). (http://www.tni.org/drugs/index.htm). 
 
UNCTAD (2002a), Trade and Development Report 2002, New York and Geneva.  
----- (2002b), World Investment Report 2002 – Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness, 
New York and Geneva. 
------ (2003). Trade Preferences for LDCs: An Early Assessment of Benefits and Possible Improvements.” 
New York and Geneva. 
------ (2004a). “UNCTAD XI – The Spirit of Sao Paulo”. UNCTAD XI, 17 June 2004. 
------ (2004b). “Developing countries launch New Round of trade negotiations”. UNCTAD XI, Press release 
17 June 2004. 
------ (2004c). “High-Level Round Table on Trade and Poverty”, summary, UNCTAD XI, 17 June 2004. 
 
Vos, R. Ganuza, E., and S. Morley (2004). “Exportaciones crecientes, menor crecimiento y mayor 
desigualdades: ¿La liberalización comercial tiene la culpa?,” in E. Ganuza et al, Eds, ¿Quién se beneficia del 
libre comercio? Promoción de exportaciones en América Latina y el Caribe en los 90. Bogotá, Alfa-Omega 
Publishers (www.undp.org/rblac/finaldrafts). 
 
Winters, A., McCulloch, N. and A. McKay (2004). “Trade liberalization and Poverty: The evidence so far, “ 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol, XLII, March, pp. 72-115. 
 
World Bank (2003), Global Economic Prospects- Realizing the Development Promise of the Doha Agenda, 
Washington DC. 
 
World Trade Organisation/WTO (2003). European Communities –Conditions for Conceding Tariff 
Preferences to Developing Countries. Report by Special Panel. Geneva, 1 December  (WT/DS246/R). 
------ (2004). “European Commission. Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing 
Countries” (ARB-2004-1/17). Geneva, 20 September (WT/DS246/14). 
 
 
 
   
 
Documentos de trabajo editados 
 
 
DT5/2004 Exportaciones y crecimiento económico: el caso de España, Vicente Donoso, Víctor 
Martín. 
 
DT4/2004 Sobre las dificultades de medición del contagio financiero, Ángel Vilariño. 
 
DT3/2004 La incidencia de las transferencias del Gobierno en la distribución de la renta en 
Estados Unidos: 1981-2000, Enrique Palazuelos. 
 
DT2/2004 Technology and the generation of international knowledge spillovers. An 
application to Spanish Manufacturing Firms, Isabel Álvarez, José Molero. 
 
DT1/2004 Emigración y desarrollo. Implicaciones económicas, José Antonio Alonso. 
 
DT13/2003 Spanish foreign aid: Flaws of an emerging framework, José Antonio Alonso. 
 
DT12/2003 Specialisation in services of European Union countries: a proposal of taxonomy, 
José Molero, Micheline Boueri. 
 
DT11/2003  The profile of human capital in technological regimes, Berta Sánchez. 
 
DT10/2003 The geography of the knowledge based economy in Europe: a regional approach, 
Xavier Vence, M. González. 
 
DT9/2003 El proceso de globalización. Análisis de las propuestas alternativas al consenso de 
Washington, Carlos Garcimartín, Santiago Díaz de Sarralde. 
 
DT8/2003 Poverty Reduction and Aid Policy, José Antonio Alonso, Carlos Garcimartín. 
 
DT7/2003 La educación en la Política Comunitaria de Ayuda al Desarrollo. Perspectivas para 
América Latina, Gloria Angulo. 
 
DT6/2003 Regional Trading Blocks as a response to Global Poverty: a critique of the Euro-
Mediterranean Agreements, Andrew Mold. 
 
DT5/2003 Openness and Institutions. The Developmental Perspective, Jeroen Vergote. 
 
DT4/2003 La Europa de la ampliación, Vicente Donoso, Víctor Martín, Federico Soto, David 
de Carlos. 
 
DT3/2003 Service export flows: empirical evidence for the European Union, José Molero, Sara 
Barcenilla. 
 
DT2/2003 International competitiveness of the services sector in some european countries, 
Carlos Díaz de la Guardia, José Molero. 
 
DT1/2003 The technological strategies of multinational enterprises: their implications for 
national systems of innovation, José Molero, Isabel Álvarez. 
 
 
